Leta York v. Todd Boatman
487 S.W.3d 635
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Leta York received fee simple title to 153.185 acres (subject to a four‑acre life estate granted earlier) after partition of her parents' property; in 1995 she executed a general warranty deed conveying the 153.185 acres to her daughter Gwendolyn.
- The 1995 deed recited conveyance of York’s interest “as her separate property”; Henry York (Leta’s husband) was not a signatory and died shortly after the deed was executed.
- In 2003 Gwendolyn executed an undelivered gift deed purporting to return the 153.185 acres to York; that deed was never delivered/recorded, was later rescinded by Gwendolyn, placed in court registry, and ultimately released to Gwendolyn.
- Gwendolyn died in 2012; her will devised the property to her son Todd, and Gwendolyn’s estate conveyed the 153.185 acres to Todd.
- York sued Todd in 2013 seeking to void the 1995 deed or, alternatively, impose a constructive trust; the trial court held the 1995 deed was a valid gift, declared Todd fee simple owner subject to a four‑acre life estate in York, and dismissed York’s constructive trust claim as time‑barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of 1995 deed (gift) | York: deed was not a present gift (not in praesenti), failed to reserve husband's homestead/life estate, and was executed only to shield property from nursing‑home claims; lack of donative intent and delivery | Todd: deed is a valid conveyance of York’s interest; homestead/life estate of Henry is inoperative against deed as to York but remains effective against third parties until Henry’s death; presumption favors gift by parent to child, and delivery/acceptance established by recording and Gwendolyn’s possession | Court: 1995 deed was a valid gift; deed conveyed York’s present interest subject by operation of law to Henry’s homestead/life estate and that did not render the deed void |
| Sufficiency of evidence for key factual findings (dates, possession) | York: record lacks evidence for certain findings (exact death date of Henry, deed date, extent of Gwendolyn/Todd’s post‑1995 ownership acts) | Todd: documentary statements, recordation, tax payments, improvements, and testimony supply evidentiary basis for findings | Court: findings are legally and factually supported (date discrepancies immaterial or invited error); evidence supports that Gwendolyn and then Todd exercised ownership rights |
| Constructive trust—whether it existed and whether statute of limitations barred York’s claim | York: if deed was made with oral agreement to reconvey, equity should impose a constructive trust and statute of limitations did not run until repudiation of that trust | Todd: no constructive trust was ever imposed; because 1995 conveyance was a valid gift, no equitable claim accrued; statute of limitations bars York’s claim | Court: no constructive trust existed (it is an equitable remedy imposed by court); York’s claim never accrued because presumption of gift was not rebutted; statute of limitations thus bars relief |
| Effect of alleged agreement to reconvey and unclean hands/Medicaid policy | York: oral agreement to reconvey (to shield assets for Medicaid) makes reconveyance equitable; Kostelnik supports equitable relief despite policy concerns | Todd: even if such an oral agreement existed, York failed to overcome presumption of gift; courts are disinclined to create trusts to enforce such schemes | Court: Kostelnik inapplicable because no trial court imposed a constructive trust here; public‑policy/unclean‑hands arguments do not change outcome since no trust was imposed and gift presumption stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Woodworth v. Cortez, 660 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983) (deed may create an estate to commence in futuro; possession may ripen into title)
- Laster v. First Huntsville Props. Co., 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991) (homestead rights analogous to life tenancy; spouses’ interests limit conveyancing effect)
- Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1955) (recordation and acceptance support prima facie delivery of deed)
- Richardson v. Laney, 911 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995) (presumption of gift when parent conveys to child; burden to rebut)
- Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (elements of a valid gift by deed: donative intent, delivery, acceptance)
- Kostelnik v. Roberts, 680 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984) (constructive trust imposed in similar facts where trial court created trust; discussed limits of unclean hands defense)
- Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010) (legal sufficiency standard; more than a scintilla required to support fact finding)