Leslie Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 944 F.3d 1070

Police officer Aaron Stringer responded to calls that Michael Dozer had poured gasoline on a woman and tried to light her on fire; Dozer later walked near a minimart, appeared agitated, and set gasoline on the ground on fire.
Stringer arrived alone, spoke briefly with witnesses, approached Dozer without waiting for backup, ordered him to get on the ground, and shot Dozer within about a minute of arriving after Dozer allegedly advanced while holding a horseshoe-shaped bike lock.
Dozer’s mother, Leslie Crawford, alleged Fourth Amendment excessive-force and state-law wrongful-death claims, asserting Dozer suffered from schizophrenia and had prior treatment and behaviors consistent with mental illness.
The district court granted defendants’ in limine motion excluding Crawford’s testimony about her percipient observations of Dozer’s past behavior and treatment as irrelevant (and barred lay diagnosis), and the jury found no excessive force or negligence; judgment entered for defendants.
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial, holding the exclusion of Crawford’s testimony was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Relevance of mother’s testimony about Dozer’s past behavior/treatment	Crawford: her observations make it more likely Dozer was mentally ill that day and thus relevant to whether Officer Stringer knew or should have known of mental illness	Defendants: testimony irrelevant because Stringer had no prior knowledge of Dozer’s history	Court: Exclusion was an abuse of discretion; prior-behavior evidence is relevant to whether Dozer was mentally ill that day and to what a reasonable officer should have perceived
Lay-opinion / Rule 701 challenge	Crawford: she offered percipient observations, not a medical diagnosis; competent lay testimony about observed behavior is admissible	Defendants: Crawford lacks expertise to opine on mental illness	Court: Agreed Crawford could testify to her observations so long as she did not purport to diagnose schizophrenia; Rule 701 objection does not bar percipient testimony
Harmless-error assessment	Crawford: exclusion undermined a central component of her case, weakened her expert’s opinion, and allowed defense to argue there was “zero” evidence of mental illness	Defendants: error harmless because other evidence (officer training, expert opinion, eyewitness testimony) supported verdict	Court: Error was not harmless; exclusion likely tainted the verdict and warranted a new trial

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (establishing objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force)
Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024 (consideration of suspect’s mental illness in force reasonableness analysis)
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (governmental interest in deadly force diminished when suspect is mentally ill)
Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864 (officers’ awareness of emotional disturbance is relevant to force reasonableness)
Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938 (evidence that supports one version of events is admissible when perceptions before force are disputed)
Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388 (evidence unknown to officers can be relevant for credibility and reconstruction of events)
Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834 (standard for assessing prejudicial evidentiary error in civil cases)
United States v. Espinoza, 880 F.3d 506 (corroborating evidence can make related facts more probable and thus relevant)
Hayes v. County of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252 (California negligence/deadly-force law considers pre-shooting circumstances broadly)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (Rule 401 relevance is a liberal standard)