LePretre v. Lend Lease Construction, Inc.
2017 IL App (1st) 162320
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff William LePretre, an ironworker employed by Bond Steel, slipped and fell while installing 27-foot rebar at a Chicago construction site; Bond Steel was subcontracted by Adjustable Forms, which was subcontracted by general contractor Lend Lease.
- Plaintiff sued Lend Lease (among others) alleging Lend Lease retained supervisory control and thus owed a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (and agency/vicarious liability theories) for unsafe conditions (overlong rebar, confined workspace, loose dirt).
- Lend Lease moved for summary judgment, attaching the owner–contractor and contractor–subcontractor agreements and depositions showing subcontractors controlled means/methods and jobsite safety duties.
- Contracts allocated job-specific safety, cleanup, supervision, and means/methods responsibility to Adjustable (and Adjustable’s subcontractors); Lend Lease retained general coordination and a project-wide safety program but did not direct daily rebar work.
- Depositions corroborated that Bond Steel took daily directions from Adjustable’s superintendent, not Lend Lease; Lend Lease performed site orientations and general coordination but did not stop or direct Bond Steel’s rebar work.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Lend Lease; on appeal the First District affirmed, holding Lend Lease did not retain the operative control necessary to impose liability under § 414 or agency law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lend Lease retained supervisory control (Restatement § 414) over subcontractor work | Lend Lease as GC retained control of means/methods and had on-site safety authority, so LePretre says § 414 duty exists | Lend Lease argues contracts and facts show only general supervisory rights; subcontractors controlled means/methods and safety | Held: No. Contract language and deposition evidence show only general supervisory authority; no retained control of operative details to trigger § 414 duty |
| Whether Lend Lease failed to exercise supervisory control with reasonable care (if control existed) | LePretre contends Lend Lease’s safety presence and authority to stop work meant it failed to exercise care | Lend Lease argues it never exercised control over rebar installation or debris removal and did not direct Bond Steel | Held: Not reached on merits; court concluded no supervisory control exists, so this claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether Lend Lease is vicariously liable under agency/master-servant principles | LePretre argues retained control could create master-servant relationship and vicarious liability | Lend Lease asserts control was insufficient to create agency/master-servant status | Held: No. Evidence insufficient to show control over operative details needed for a master-servant relationship; agency/vicarious liability not established |
| Whether contractor safety programs, safety director, and right to stop work alone impose liability | LePretre points to Lend Lease’s safety program and authority to stop work as indicia of control | Lend Lease contends such general safety rights are typical and insufficient to show retained control over means/methods | Held: Mere existence of safety program, safety director, and right to stop work are insufficient by themselves to impose liability under § 414 |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404 (2008) (summary judgment standard)
- Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984 (2016) (§ 414 articulates basis for direct liability; agency law distinct)
- Fonseca v. Clark Construction Group, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 130308 (illustrative application of contracts and conduct showing subcontractor control)
- Madden v. F.H. Paschen/S.N. Nielson, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 362 (general rule re: independent contractors and retained control)
- Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 3d 835 (duty analysis and retained-control principles)