Leonor Lopez-Hurtado v. Jefferson Sessions, 702 F. App'x 589

Leonor Lopez-Hurtado, a Mexican national, sought cancellation of removal but the IJ denied relief based on a conviction the agency deemed a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).
The BIA reviewed the case de novo and held that Nevada Rev. Stat. § 483.530(2) (felony for false statements in driver’s license/ID applications) categorically matches the federal generic definition of a CIMT because it is "inherently fraudulent."
Lopez petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit arguing § 483.530(2) is overbroad because it criminalizes conduct that lacks intent to defraud.
The Ninth Circuit reviews the BIA’s unpublished statutory-interpretation conclusions under Skidmore deference, weighing the BIA’s reasoning and thoroughness.
The court examined whether the Nevada statute requires fraudulent intent (materiality and intent to procure a benefit) or merely knowing misrepresentation, which the court has held is not necessarily fraud.
The Ninth Circuit concluded the BIA’s analysis lacked persuasive thoroughness and that § 483.530(2) is facially overbroad compared to the generic federal CIMT definition, so the BIA erred in treating Lopez’s conviction as a categorical CIMT.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nevada § 483.530(2) is a categorical CIMT	§ 483.530(2) is overbroad; conviction can occur without intent to defraud (Lopez).	The statute is inherently fraudulent and therefore matches the generic CIMT (BIA).	The statute is overbroad; BIA erred in treating it as a categorical CIMT.
Whether BIA's unpublished conclusion merits deference	BIA did not show the statute necessarily requires fraud; its reasoning was not thorough (Lopez).	BIA has expertise and concluded statute is inherently fraudulent (BIA).	Skidmore deference applies; BIA’s decision had limited persuasive power due to lack of thorough analysis.
Whether knowing misrepresentation alone constitutes fraud for CIMT purposes	Knowing false statements in application are not necessarily material or done to procure a tangible benefit (Lopez).	Knowledge of falsity in application demonstrates intent to obtain a license/benefit (BIA).	Knowing misrepresentation alone is not enough; materiality/intent to procure are required for fraud.
Whether the agency should assess divisibility of the statute	Because statute is overbroad, the agency should examine divisibility and use categorical/divisible analysis (Lopez).	BIA treated statute as categorical and did not analyze divisibility (BIA).	Court remanded for BIA to consider whether the statute is divisible per Mathis/Descamps.

Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (jurisdictional posture for review of removal orders)
Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (BIA review standard when BIA issues independent decision)
Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (Skidmore deference to BIA unpublished interpretations)
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (U.S. 1944) (weight of agency interpretations depends on persuasiveness)
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (U.S. 2007) (realistic probability test for state statute breadth)
Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2015) (textual breadth can show realistic probability without case law)
Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (no judicial prestidigitation when statute plainly criminalizes nongeneric conduct)
Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2008) (intent to defraud requires materiality and intent to procure a benefit)
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (U.S. 2017) (materiality requires influencing approval decision)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (categorical/divisible statute framework)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (U.S. 2016) (divisibility inquiry and how to determine elements for categorical approach)