Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847

On April 1, 2013, police stopped James Leonard for a traffic infraction, found a safe in the trunk, and, after obtaining a warrant, discovered $201,100 and a Pennsylvania house bill of sale.
Texas initiated civil forfeiture under state law alleging the cash was proceeds or intended proceeds of narcotics sales; the trial court ordered forfeiture.
Petitioner's daughter (through whom the property claim arose) asserted an innocent-owner defense, claiming the money came from a recent home sale in Pennsylvania.
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed forfeiture, finding the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was tied to drug activity and rejecting the innocent-owner claim as insufficient.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the civil-forfeiture procedures, arguing the Due Process Clause requires proof by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari; Justice Thomas concurred, stressing the important historical and due-process questions raised by modern civil forfeiture practices and noting the issue was not preserved for this Court’s review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard of proof in civil forfeiture	Due process requires clear and convincing evidence to forfeit property	Preponderance of the evidence is sufficient under current law	Certiorari denied; Court did not decide the substantive question because it was raised here for the first time
Validity of modern civil in rem forfeiture	Modern forfeiture procedures may violate due process and diverge from historical practice	Historical practice and precedent allow civil in rem forfeitures with limited criminal protections	Court refused review; Justice Thomas flagged the textual-historical concerns for future consideration
Scope of historical practice supporting forfeiture	Plaintiff: founding-era forfeitures were narrower and do not support broad modern statutes	State: historical in rem forfeiture traditions justify current doctrine	No ruling on merits; concurrence questions whether modern practice aligns with founding-era scope
Characterization as civil vs. criminal (procedural protections)	If forfeitures are punitive/criminal in nature, heightened protections (e.g., jury, higher burden) should apply	Forfeiture historically proceeded in rem/civilly, permitting different procedures	Not decided; opinion cites historical cases suggesting ambiguity and need for further analysis

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (discusses forfeiture’s punitive aspects and historical grounding)
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (addresses in rem civil forfeiture procedures)
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (upholds in rem forfeiture against an innocent owner in certain circumstances)
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (describes English and early American forfeiture antecedents)
United States v. Parcel of Rumson, N.J., Land, 507 U.S. 111 (distinguishes historical forfeiture of instrumentalities from modern forfeiture of proceeds)
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (suggests some forfeiture proceedings were considered penal in nature)
United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297 (early recognition of in rem forfeiture practice)
United States v. Brig Burdett, 9 Pet. 682 (indicates historical instances where a high burden of proof was applied in forfeiture-like proceedings)