Leonard Taylor v. Troy Steele
6 F.4th 796
| 8th Cir. | 2021Background
- In 2004 Leonard S. Taylor was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and related armed-criminal-action counts for the killings of his girlfriend and her three children; the jury later recommended death on the murder counts.
- During the penalty phase Taylor instructed his trial counsel not to give a closing argument, citing his Muslim faith; counsel and the trial court advised him of the consequences and recorded a colloquy confirming the decision was voluntary and informed.
- The defense presented minimal mitigation (a stipulation about good behavior in custody); counsel complied with Taylor’s instruction and did not argue at penalty.
- Taylor’s direct appeal and state postconviction petition were denied; he later filed a federal habeas petition raising multiple claims and received a COA on whether counsel was ineffective for following Taylor’s directive to forgo closing argument.
- The district court denied habeas relief; on appeal the Eighth Circuit addressed (1) whether counsel’s compliance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland and (2) whether the claim was procedurally defaulted and potentially salvaged by Martinez v. Ryan.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not giving closing argument at penalty phase | Taylor: Decision to forgo argument is trial strategy; counsel had authority and thus was ineffective for following Taylor’s directive | State: Taylor made an informed, voluntary decision; counsel’s acquiescence to client instruction is not per se deficient | Counsel was not ineffective; following a competent client’s express directive does not establish deficient performance; claim lacks merit |
| Whether forgoing closing argument is a client-controlled “fundamental” decision or counsel-controlled trial strategy | Taylor: It is tactical and thus counsel should have refused his directive | State: The fundamental/strategy distinction is immaterial here; a competent client may direct counsel on such decisions and counsel may comply | The court treated the distinction as immaterial and held counsel may comply with a competent client’s express instruction without being ineffective |
| Whether Martinez v. Ryan excuses procedural default of the ineffective-assistance claim | Taylor: Postconviction counsel’s failure to raise the claim excuses default under Martinez (initial-review collateral proceeding) | State: Martinez only applies if the underlying ineffective-assistance claim is substantial; Taylor’s claim is not substantial | Taylor satisfied the initial-review prong but failed the substantiality prong; Martinez does not excuse the default and the claim remains procedurally barred |
Key Cases Cited
- McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (clients control certain fundamental decisions; counsel may not override express client objectives)
- Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (counsel may proceed without explicit client consent when client is unresponsive; distinguishes from directive refusals)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for deficient performance and prejudice in ineffective-assistance claims)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow exception to procedural default when initial-review collateral counsel is ineffective)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right of a defendant to make certain choices, even to his own detriment)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (following a defendant’s explicit instruction not to file an appeal negates an ineffective-assistance claim)