253 So. 3d 526
Fla.2018Background
- Gonzalez was convicted of two 2009 murders; jury recommended death sentences (10–2) and this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- He filed a Rule 3.851 postconviction motion, later amended to include Hurst-based relief; the postconviction court granted a new penalty phase on Hurst grounds but denied other claims.
- On appeal from the partial denial, Gonzalez asserts two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims: (1) failure to renew/change venue motion and (2) failure to challenge the indictment based on alleged grand-jury interference by the sheriff.
- The venue claim rests on allegedly inflammatory local media coverage and an assertedly cursory voir dire; trial counsel did move for change of venue, used questionnaires, excused two biased jurors for cause, and Gonzalez personally accepted the jury.
- The indictment claim alleges Sheriff Morgan greeted prospective jurors (on Mondays/Tuesdays) and thus may have influenced the grand jury; the claim was speculative and offered no legal basis to challenge an already-empaneled grand jury under Florida law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance for failing to renew/change venue | Gonzalez: counsel inadequately argued venue motion, failed to present inflammatory media articles, voir dire was cursory so jurors may have been biased | State: counsel moved for venue, voir dire and questionnaires addressed publicity, biased jurors were excused and Gonzalez accepted jury | Denied — record positively refutes claim; counsel’s performance was reasonable and Gonzalez showed no prejudice |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to challenge indictment/grand jury | Gonzalez: sheriff’s practice of greeting jurors could have influenced grand jury; counsel should have challenged indictment | State: allegation speculative; no legal basis to challenge an empaneled grand jury; Christian inapplicable to a sheriff | Denied — claim legally insufficient and speculative; Florida law bars post-empanelment objections absent selection defects |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. 2014) (direct-appeal opinion setting out facts and affirming convictions and sentences)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (holding Sixth Amendment requires jury to find facts necessary for death sentence)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (applying Hurst to Florida capital sentencing)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 2013) (postconviction evidentiary-hearing standards)
- Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2009) (when claims may be summarily denied)
- Dillbeck v. State, 964 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2007) (requirements for demonstrating counsel’s failure to seek change of venue)
- Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1973) (limitations on challenging a grand jury after empanelment)
- Rudd v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1975) (state attorney influence on grand jury may warrant setting aside an indictment)
- Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1986) (standards for demonstrating counsel deficiency)
- Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2003) (factors for change of venue review)
- Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1997) (voir dire rehabilitation and pervasive community bias analysis)
- Ellerbee v. State, 232 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 2017) (postconviction burden and speculation insufficiency)
