Leonard Kidd v. Michael Lemke
734 F.3d 696
7th Cir.2013Background
- Kidd was convicted of ten counts of murder in 1987 and sentenced to death; on appeal his conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- At the new trial Kidd waived counsel and represented himself despite warnings; he was convicted again and is serving a life sentence.
- During remand, Kidd sought new private counsel; ultimately, he proceeded pro se with standby counsel after the court warned him of the risks.
- The penalty phase included mitigating evidence of cognitive impairments, and Kidd was again sentenced to death; in 2003, Governor Ryan commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.
- Kidd pursued state postconviction relief arguing (1) lack of competency hearing due to medications and mental impairment and (2) involuntary waiver; the trial court and Illinois courts rejected these arguments.
- Kidd then filed a federal habeas petition challenging the voluntariness and knowingness of his waiver; the district court denied relief, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were Kidd's warnings sufficient to render the waiver knowing and intelligent? | Kidd contends warnings were inadequate and did not ensure an informed choice. | State courts found warnings adequate and tailored to Kidd's circumstances. | Warnings were sufficient; waiver knowing and intelligent. |
| Did the trial court adequately assess Kidd's subjective understanding of the waiver? | Court failed to probe Kidd's medical history and potential cognitive impairment. | Court's inquiry was thorough given the circumstances and Kidd's responses were pertinent. | Court's assessment was sufficiently thorough; not objectively unreasonable. |
| Did Kidd's medical/mental condition preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver? | Medication and mental impairment could have undermined understanding of the waiver. | Evidence did not show a conclusive incapacity; experts' views were disputed and not dispositive. | No clear and convincing evidence that condition prevented a knowing waiver. |
| Was Kidd's waiver voluntary given claims of coercion or abandonment by counsel? | Strunck's hostility and advice to proceed pro se forced Kidd to choose self-representation. | Record showed no purposeful coercion or abandonment; Kidd chose pro se as strategic decision. | Waiver was voluntary. |
| Under AEDPA, was the state court's decision reasonable in applying Supreme Court precedent on waivers? | State court misapplied precedent by failing to rigorously scrutinize the waiver. | State court correctly applied the standard and exercised sound judgment on the record. | State court decision was reasonable; habeas relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to represent oneself; knowing and intelligent waiver)
- Tovar v. Foster, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (right to counsel and waiver at critical stages)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competence to waive counsel separate from waiver knowingness)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (standard for intelligent waiver depends on case facts and circumstances)
- Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (due scope of inquiry for knowing waiver; sequence of warnings)
- Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (trial court's duty to probe circumstances of waiver)
- United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (prior experience weighs in favor of understanding waiver)
- United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001) (waiver can be valid without deep understanding of counsel's role)
- Smith v. Grams, 565 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2009) (rigor of pre-waiver procedures not always fatal to waiver)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (AEDPA standard of review; objective reasonableness)