Leonard Kidd v. David Gomez, 2 F.4th 677

On January 12, 1984, Leonard Kidd stabbed four people to death and set the building on fire; he later led police to physical evidence (a knife with trace blood).
On the night of the murders Kidd made a statement that implicated both himself and his half-brother Leroy Orange while blaming Orange for the killings; Kidd later recanted that account.
Over a year later Kidd voluntarily testified under oath twice (at Orange’s trial and at his own sentencing after a guilty plea) that he alone committed the four murders.
In 1992 Kidd moved to suppress the night-of-the-murders statements, alleging severe physical abuse and coercion by police (including alleged torture at Area 2); the state court credited officers’ testimony and denied suppression.
Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death (later commuted to life); state postconviction relief alleging police abuse was denied; he then filed a federal habeas petition arguing unreasonable factual findings and coerced confession error.
The district court denied habeas relief; on appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that even if the night-of-the-murder statement was improperly admitted, its admission was harmless under the Brecht standard given Kidd’s two later sworn confessions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the state court’s factual determination that Kidd was not abused was unreasonable under AEDPA	Kidd: police tortured/coerced him (marks, shocks, slaps, threats); state finding was wrong	State: trial court credited officer testimony; no objective proof of coercion	Denied—AEDPA not satisfied and district court decision affirmed
Whether the allegedly coerced night-of-the-murders confession was admissible	Kidd: its admission was coerced and prejudicial	State: even if improperly admitted, other evidence made it cumulative	Harmless error under Brecht—no substantial and injurious effect on verdict
Proper harmless-error standard on federal habeas review	Kidd: challenges application of harmlessness; disputes reliance on sufficiency-type analysis	State: Brecht governs; outcome unaffected even if AEDPA review also required	Court applied Brecht and found no prejudice; AEDPA issue not outcome-determinative
Weight of Kidd’s two later sworn confessions	Kidd: later confessions were used only to show inconsistency, not guilt	State: two voluntary sworn confessions are extremely probative and damaging	Court: those sworn confessions were dispositive; they render any error harmless

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (habeas relief requires showing error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on verdict)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (harmless-error principle quoted in Brecht)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (a defendant’s confession is highly probative and damaging)
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (context for the probative force of confessions)
Hinton v. Uchtman, 395 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (admission of coerced confession found harmless where independent evidence of guilt was abundant)