Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee
2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1152
Tenn.2011Background
- Smith was convicted in 1985 of first degree felony murder for Pierce and in 1989 for Webb; death sentence imposed for Webb and life for Pierce, after venue change to Hamblen County.
- This post-conviction case consolidated claims challenging both Webb and Pierce convictions and sentences, with later focus on the Webb sentencing errors and Pierce-related timeliness.
- At 1995 resentencing for Webb, Judge Brown approved a death sentence after Smith waived mitigation and final argument; counsel failed to recuse despite Brown’s prosecutorial/judicial ties.
- The post-conviction court and Court of Criminal Appeals later addressed whether Smith was intellectually disabled under Coleman v. State, requiring a remand for proper IQ/functional IQ analysis under Coleman’s standard.
- Smith’s Pierce post-conviction claims were held time-barred under the 1988-1991 statute of limitations, with discussion of Burford tolling and later legislative changes.Restrictive tolling provisions were also analyzed.
- The Court ultimately affirmed Pierce and Webb convictions, vacated the Webb death sentence, and remanded for Coleman-based IQ proceedings and for a new Webb resentencing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to a fair trial at resentencing | Counsel failed to adequately support recusal of Judge Brown. | Recusal was unnecessary; no prejudice shown. | Reversed as to due-process prejudice from lack of recusal. |
| Voir dire and juror bias in Webb case | Failure to question jurors about victim experiences biased juror Bagwell. | No actual bias proven; Bagwell not shown biased. | Deficient performance but no prejudice; no retrial required. |
| Intellectual disability hearing | Coleman standard requires original IQ/adaptive deficits analysis. | Coleman should be applied; current record insufficient. | Remand for Coleman-based determination of intellectual disability. |
| Pierce post-conviction statute of limitations | Due process tolling should apply; counsel's representation affected timeliness. | No tolling; timely filing required; no Burford/Williams-like tolling. | Pierce claims barred by statute of limitations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) (due process tolling when timely assertion obstructed by procedural traps)
- Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001) (possible due process tolling for counsel misrepresentation or miscommunication)
- Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000) (due process tolling; flexible analysis for timely post-conviction relief)
- Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011) (redefines intellectual disability standard; remand for proper IQ evidence)
- Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (precedes Coleman; due process in ID inquiry)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (objective standard for recusal/ bias; case-specific)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (recognizes non-harmless-errors in capital cases; impartiality concern)