Leonard Blackmon v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 411
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- On July 23, 2014, Donald Courtway discovered a broken spigot lock and a bucket of running water outside his daughter’s house; he went to Hale’s driveway to investigate.
- Courtway confronted Hale and Blackmon; Hale offered to pay for the water and Courtway said he would call the police.
- Blackmon then produced an open pocketknife; after Courtway feigned reaching for a weapon, Blackmon returned the knife and left. Courtway later called police; Blackmon admitted to taking water.
- Blackmon was charged with intimidation (I.C. § 35‑45‑2‑1(a)(2)) alleging he threatened Courtway to place him in fear of retaliation for Courtway having "caught" him stealing water; conviction elevated to Level 5 felony because a deadly weapon was drawn.
- At trial the State argued the prior lawful act was either that Courtway "caught" Blackmon stealing water or that Courtway "confronted" him about stealing water; defense focused on showing Courtway did not catch Blackmon in the act.
- The trial court denied a directed verdict and the jury convicted; on appeal the court reversed the intimidation conviction for insufficient evidence and a fatal variance between the complaint and proof.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Blackmon's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved the prior lawful act alleged in the information (Courtway caught Blackmon stealing water) | The State contended circumstantial evidence plus Blackmon’s admission proved he stole water and that Courtway’s confrontation sufficed to show he had been caught | Blackmon argued Courtway did not see or catch him in the act; record showed Courtway did not know who broke the spigot or turned on the water | Reversed: evidence did not prove Courtway "caught" Blackmon as charged; insufficiency of proof on that element |
| Whether evidence proved intent to place Courtway in fear of retaliation for the specified prior lawful act | The State argued the jury could reasonably infer intent to retaliate for being confronted about stealing water | Blackmon argued no evidence showed intent to retaliate for being caught; knife-drawing occurred only after threat to call police and could indicate intent to prevent police call (a different statutory theory) | Reversed: even under State’s broader view, evidence was insufficient to show intent to retaliate for the specified prior lawful act |
| Whether variance between charging information ("caught") and trial proof/argument ("confronted") was harmless | The State claimed the terms are effectively the same and the variance was not prejudicial | Blackmon argued he was misled and framed his defense around showing he was not caught; variance impaired his ability to prepare defense | Reversed: variance was material and misled defendant; violated notice and fair-preparation rights |
| Whether conviction may be sustained under a different statutory subsection (intent to compel conduct) | State implicitly suggested alternate theory (preventing Courtway from calling police) could support conviction | Blackmon did not concede; trial charged (a)(2) only | Court declined to recharacterize charge; conviction vacated for (a)(2) count (possession conviction unaffected) |
Key Cases Cited
- Casey v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting intimidation statute and requiring proof that defendant intended to retaliate for a prior lawful act)
- Ransley v. State, 850 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (anger alone insufficient; State must prove intent to retaliate for particular prior lawful act)
- Myers v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1360 (Ind. 1987) (charging instrument must apprise accused of allegations so defendant can prepare a defense; material variance mandates reversal)
- Madison v. State, 130 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 1955) (definition of variance between pleading and proof)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt)