Leon Davis, Jr. v. State of Florida
207 So. 3d 142
| Fla. | 2016Background
- On December 13, 2007 Leon Davis, Jr. entered Headley Insurance in Lake Wales armed with a .357 revolver, duct tape, lighter, gloves and gasoline; he demanded money, bound two employees (Yvonne Bustamante and Juanita Luciano), poured gasoline on them, set them on fire, and shot a bystander (Brandon Greisman).
- Both women suffered catastrophic burns (≈80–90% body surface); Luciano was 24 weeks pregnant, gave birth to an infant who survived three days; Bustamante and Luciano later died from burn complications.
- Multiple eyewitnesses saw Davis at the scene, two (Greisman and Carlos Ortiz) identified him from photopacks and in court; Bustamante identified Davis at the scene while gravely injured.
- Evidence tying Davis to the crime included Walmart surveillance of purchases (cooler, gloves, lighter), purchase of a Dan Wesson .357 days earlier, blood/abrasions on Davis after the crime, a black Nissan Altima with accelerant detection on floor mats, and recovered projectiles consistent with the gun make.
- Jury convicted Davis of three counts of first-degree murder (including the infant), attempted first-degree murder, armed robbery, and arson; jury recommended death unanimously for two murders and 8–4 for the infant; trial court imposed two death sentences and life for the infant.
- On direct appeal Davis raised: admissibility of Bustamante’s statements as a dying declaration, reliability/suggestiveness of photopack IDs, admissibility of gruesome victim photographs, and validity of the ‘‘avoid arrest’’ aggravator; the court also addressed Hurst v. Florida error and proportionality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Bustamante’s out‑of‑court statements (dying declaration) | State: Bustamante was gravely injured, believed death was imminent, and her statements qualify as a dying declaration admissible despite Crawford. | Davis: Crawford bars admission of testimonial hearsay where declarant is unavailable and defendant had no prior cross‑examination; dying‑declaration exception should be abrogated or Bustamante lacked belief of imminent death. | Court: Dying declaration survives Crawford; trial court correctly admitted Bustamante’s statements under the dying‑declaration exception based on totality of circumstances. |
| Photopack identifications (Greisman, Ortiz) | State: Photopacks were proper and identifications reliable given clear observations and quick, certain identifications. | Davis: Photopacks were unnecessarily suggestive (book‑in numbers revealing year 2007) and tainted in‑court IDs. | Court: Photopacks not unduly suggestive; factors (opportunity to view, attention, certainty, timing) support reliability; in‑court IDs admissible. |
| Admission of gruesome victim photographs | State: Photographs were relevant to show extent/nature of injuries, manner of death, and assist medical testimony. | Davis: Photos were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. | Court: Photographs relevant, assisted medical testimony, and were not so inflammatory as to be fundamentally unfair; admission proper. |
| Avoid‑arrest aggravator as to Bustamante | State: Circumstantial evidence (victim could identify killer, masked camera, binding, shooting and burning) shows dominant motive was eliminating a witness. | Davis: Insufficient proof that sole or dominant motive was witness elimination. | Court: Competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Bustamante was murdered to avoid arrest; aggravator upheld. |
| Sufficiency of evidence / Proportionality | State: Evidence overwhelmingly supports convictions and death sentences; aggravators outweigh mitigation. | Davis: Mitigation and issues (e.g., Hurst error) require relief. | Court: Independent sufficiency review passed; proportionality satisfied—crime among most aggravated and least mitigated. |
| Hurst v. Florida error (jury fact‑finding/unanimity) | State: Any Hurst error was harmless because jury was instructed on sufficiency/weight and unanimously recommended death; evidence of aggravators was significant and uncontroverted. | Davis: Jury did not make unanimous findings on each aggravator; harmless‑error cannot be satisfied by appellate weighing, so error may be harmful. | Court (majority): Any Hurst error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—unanimous death recommendations and overwhelming, essentially uncontroverted aggravating evidence. Concurrence disagreed, finding harmlessness not proven. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless declarant unavailable and defendant had prior cross‑examination)
- Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (historical recognition of the dying‑declaration hearsay exception)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Sixth Amendment requires jury, not judge, to find facts necessary to impose death sentence)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court: jury must unanimously find aggravators sufficient and outweigh mitigation; unanimous recommendation required)
- Hayward v. State, 24 So.3d 17 (Fla. 2009) (discusses Crawford and testimonial statements)
- Beauchamp v. State, 796 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2011) (holding dying declaration exception survives Crawford)