Leocadio Ramirez Jr. v. State
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1490
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- In Nov. 2011 Leocadio Ramirez Jr. set fire to his estranged wife Chana Ramirez’s car, then forced entry into a home on Twombly Drive wielding swords and threatened Chana; a deputy arrested him after Chana had called 9-1-1.
- The Twombly Drive house belonged to Janie Perez; Janie had given her son Andy a key, and Andy and Chana had stayed overnight without Janie’s explicit permission.
- Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury of arson and burglary of a habitation; he appealed both convictions but challenged only the burglary conviction.
- The indictment alleged Ramirez entered a habitation “without the effective consent of Chana Ramirez, the owner thereof.” Ramirez argued the State failed to prove Chana was the “owner” under the Penal Code.
- The Penal Code defines “owner” to include title, possession, or a greater right to possession; the State relied on a theory that Chana had a greater right to possession (as a guest) than Ramirez, who had none.
- The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the Jackson sufficiency standard and concluded a rational jury could find Chana had a greater right to possession than Ramirez; it affirmed both convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved the person named in the indictment (Chana) was an “owner” of the Twombly Drive house under the Penal Code | State: Chana need not hold title; showing a greater right to possession than Ramirez suffices | Ramirez: Chana had no right to possession (she was an unauthorized overnight guest), so she cannot be the “owner” alleged in the indictment | Held: Sufficient evidence that Chana had a greater right to possession (as a guest who used the kitchen and denied Ramirez entry); conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242 (burden to prove the person named in the indictment is the owner)
- Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409 (Penal Code’s definition of owner is expansive)
- Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390 (greater-right-to-possession method applies broadly)
- Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95 (remand: limited habitual access to property can support greater right to possession)
- Freeman v. State, 707 S.W.2d 597 (right to possession measured at time of the offense)
