Leners v. Leners
925 N.W.2d 704
Neb.2019Background
- Sharon and Stacy Leners married in 1997; Sharon filed for dissolution in 2016. They have two children; the younger was 15 at trial.
- Temporary order established joint custody with a parenting-time schedule tailored to Stacy’s sporadic work travel (9th–15th and 24th–month end).
- Financially, Sharon is a nurse with a 401(k), pension, and a Nebraska public-employee account (approx. $250/mo pension estimate); Stacy works for Union Pacific and has a railroad retirement benefit with Tier I (nondivisible) and Tier II (divisible) components (Tier II estimate ~$253.50–$360/mo).
- At trial the court found Stacy more credible, described the case as highly contentious, and awarded shared legal and physical custody adopting Stacy’s parenting schedule.
- The court awarded each spouse their own retirement accounts (Sharon: 401(k), employer pension, NPERs; Stacy: Union Pacific pension and 401(k)), entered judgment awarding Sharon $50,019, and ordered Sharon to pay Stacy $9,000 in attorney fees.
- Sharon appealed, arguing errors in federal pension-law interpretation, custody and parenting-time award, allocation of child expenses, and the attorney-fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sharon) | Defendant's Argument (Stacy) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Division of railroad retirement benefits | Court misinterpreted federal law; court should have equitably divided Stacy’s Tier II pension (and not awarded him whole pension) | Court’s award of each party’s own pension equitably divides marital estate given lack of present dollar valuations | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion in awarding Stacy his railroad pension; any misstatements about divorced-spouse annuity did not render division inequitable |
| Assumption re: divorced-spouse annuity | Court wrongly assumed Sharon would receive a divorced-spouse annuity from Union Pacific | Even if assumption was erroneous, it favored Stacy and does not require reversal given overall equitable division | Held: court erred in assuming entitlement but error did not require reversal |
| Custody and parenting time | Sharon sought sole custody; argued shared custody/ equal parenting time is not in younger child’s best interests | Stacy sought shared legal and physical custody and continuation/extension of temporary schedule to accommodate work | Affirmed: shared legal/physical custody and adopted parenting schedule were not untenable given child’s preference, parental fitness, and work schedule accommodations |
| Allocation of child expenses | Court should have required equal division of all reasonable/necessary child expenses (including extracurriculars) without needing mutual agreement | Court’s order allocated medical expenses and assigned routine expenses to each parent during their parenting time; extracurriculars required mutual agreement to prevent unilateral imposition | Affirmed: decree adequately addressed required expense allocation and did not abuse discretion |
| Attorney fees | Award of $9,000 against Sharon was improper | Stacy sought fees for litigation caused by Sharon’s vexatious conduct | Affirmed: court permissibly awarded fees under inherent-power doctrine given Sharon’s vexatious, unfounded, dilatory conduct (destruction of property, incendiary texts, false testimony) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (federal Railroad Retirement Act and preemption/characterization of benefits)
- Shearer v. Shearer, 270 Neb. 178 (Nebraska recognizing Railroad Retirement Board must honor divorce decrees classifying Tier II as divisible)
- Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788 (trial court discretion in valuing and dividing pension rights in dissolution)
- Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030 (child’s expressed intelligent preference is entitled to consideration in custody determinations)
- Connolly v. Connolly, 299 Neb. 103 (standard and scope of de novo review in dissolution/custody appeals)
- Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 (discussion of joint physical custody considerations)
- Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76 (courts’ inherent power to award attorney fees for vexatious or bad-faith litigation conduct)
