Leners v. Leners
925 N.W.2d 704
| Neb. | 2019Background
- Sharon and Stacy Leners married in 1997 and divorced after Sharon filed in 2016; they had two children, one age 15 at trial.
- Temporary order granted joint custody and a parenting-time schedule keyed to Stacy’s recurring work travel pattern; trial followed three weeks later.
- Financial facts: Sharon is a nurse with a 401(k), pension, and a Nebraska public-employee retirement account; Stacy worked for Union Pacific with Railroad Retirement benefits (Tier I nondivisible; Tier II potentially divisible) and a 401(k).
- The court found Stacy more credible, dissolved the marriage, awarded each party their own 401(k) and pension (Stacy the railroad pension), adopted Stacy’s parenting-time schedule (shared custody), split medical and mutually agreed activity expenses, entered a $50,019 judgment for Sharon, and ordered Sharon to pay Stacy $9,000 in attorney fees.
- Sharon appealed, arguing (1) misapplication of federal law to railroad retirement benefits, (2) error in awarding joint/shared custody and equal parenting time, (3) failure to allocate child expenses, and (4) erroneous award of attorney fees.
Issues
| Issue | Sharon’s Argument | Stacy’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court misinterpreted federal law and should have equitably divided Stacy’s Tier II railroad pension | Court erred; Tier II should be equitably divided and court wrongly assumed Sharon would receive a divorced-spouse annuity | Court’s division of retirement assets was part of an overall equitable division of the marital estate; trial court has broad discretion valuing/dividing pensions | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion. Court erred in assuming divorced-spouse annuity but that error favored Stacy; erroneous math on Tier II did not render division inequitable |
| Custody and parenting time: whether shared custody/equal parenting time is contrary to the child’s best interests | Sharon sought sole custody and argued temporary schedule harmed the 15‑year‑old and joint physical custody would not work | Stacy sought shared legal and physical custody with the temporary schedule continued to accommodate his work | Affirmed: shared custody and adopted parenting-time schedule reasonable given both parents fit, child’s preferences considered, and schedule minimizes conflict |
| Allocation of child expenses (clothing, extracurriculars, etc.) | Court should have required equal division of all reasonable/necessary child expenses without needing mutual agreement | Court’s decree allocated medical expenses and required written mutual agreement for extracurriculars; trial court discretion to avoid unilateral imposition | Affirmed: decree satisfied statutory allocation requirements; court need not force one parent to pay for activities unilaterally chosen by the other |
| Award of attorney fees to Stacy | Award was improper | Fees warranted because Sharon’s conduct during litigation was vexatious, unfounded, and dilatory (bad faith) | Affirmed: record supports finding of vexatious conduct and unnecessary fees; court may exercise inherent power to award fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13 (Neb. 2018) (standard of review in dissolution: de novo on record to assess abuse of discretion)
- Gerber v. P & L Finance Co., 301 Neb. 463 (Neb. 2018) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
- Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (U.S. 1979) (distinction between Railroad Retirement Tier I and Tier II benefits)
- Shearer v. Shearer, 270 Neb. 178 (Neb. 2005) (Railroad Retirement Board must honor divorce decrees that characterize Tier II as divisible)
- Webster v. Webster, 271 Neb. 788 (Neb. 2006) (trial court has broad discretion valuing/dividing pension rights)
- Vogel v. Vogel, 262 Neb. 1030 (Neb. 2002) (child’s expressed preference entitled to consideration if reasonable)
- Connolly v. Connolly, 299 Neb. 103 (Neb. 2018) (reappraisal of evidence on appellate de novo review)
- Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 (Neb. 2017) (joint physical custody considerations)
- Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76 (Neb. 2018) (courts’ inherent power to award attorney fees for vexatious conduct)
- McGraw v. McGraw, 186 W. Va. 113 (W. Va. 1991) (Tier I benefits not divisible)