Lena Childs v. San Diego Family Housing LLC, 22 F.4th 1092

Childs, a Navy service member, leased a military-family house owned by San Diego Family Housing, LLC (SDFH), a public–private venture in which the U.S. Navy is a minority LLC member; Lincoln managed the property and hired InDepth for mold remediation.
The Childs family alleged repeated water-intrusion and mold problems and sued SDFH and Lincoln in California state court asserting negligence and related tort claims.
SDFH and Lincoln removed to federal court and moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley as government contractors acting at the direction of the federal government; the United States filed a statement of interest opposing immunity.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss; SDFH and Lincoln appealed and obtained a partial stay.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 — specifically whether the denial of Yearsley derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral‑order doctrine.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an order denying derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley is immediately appealable under §1291/collateral‑order doctrine	Denial is not immediately appealable; appeal must wait until final judgment	Denial is immediately appealable because Yearsley provides immunity from suit (a right not to stand trial)	Denied: collateral‑order third prong fails — denial is effectively reviewable after final judgment and does not imperil a substantial public interest; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether Campbell‑Ewald altered precedent that such denials are not immediately appealable	Prior Ninth Circuit precedent (Alaska, Rodriguez) remains controlling; passing language in Campbell‑Ewald does not change the Hallock analysis	Campbell‑Ewald’s characterization of Yearsley as immunity from suit undermines Alaska/Rodriguez and supports immediate appealability	Denied: Campbell‑Ewald’s passing references do not undercut Alaska and Rodriguez; Hallock's public‑interest inquiry controls

Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (establishes derivative sovereign immunity where contractor simply follows government directions)
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (formulates collateral‑order doctrine test)
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (narrows collateral‑order doctrine; third prong requires that denying immediate review would imperil a substantial public interest)
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (collateral‑order principles and separability from merits)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (qualified immunity denial is immediately appealable)
State of Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352 (9th Cir. 1995) (denial of federal sovereign immunity not immediately appealable)
Rodriguez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 627 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2010) (denial of government‑contractor defense not immediately appealable)
Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010) (denial of Yearsley derivative sovereign immunity not immediately appealable)
Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016) (discusses Yearsley’s scope but does not resolve appealability question)
In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (discusses limits on Yearsley and governmental discretion)