LEMUS v. SHAFFNER, 1:20-cv-03839-RCL

Background

Plaintiff Ana Lemus and her son O.C.L., a native Spanish speaker with learning disabilities, enrolled at District of Columbia International Charter School (DCI) beginning in middle school.
DCI repeatedly amended O.C.L.’s IEP, reducing specialized instruction hours compared to his earlier Tubman Elementary IEP; during DCI attendance his benchmark test scores declined.
In January 2020 O.C.L. threatened a teacher; an MDR concluded the conduct was not a manifestation of his disability and DCI expelled him.
Administrative proceedings produced two Hearing Officer Determinations (HODs): (1) Oct. 6, 2020 upheld the expulsion; (2) Oct. 26, 2020 found DCI denied FAPE (ordering compensatory services and an independent evaluation).
Lemus filed two district-court suits arising from the administrative process: Lemus v. DCI (appealing the expulsion HOD and asserting Title VI claims) and DCI v. Lemus (DCI’s appeal of the FAPE HOD).
The district court: (a) denied dismissal of most IDEA-based claims in Lemus v. DCI but dismissed Lemus’s Title VI claims for failure to plead intentional discrimination, and (b) found good cause for a brief service delay in DCI v. Lemus, ordered Lemus to respond to DCI’s stay motion, and administratively stayed the Oct. 26 HOD pending further motion practice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statute of limitations / relation-back of amended complaint	Lemus timely appealed the Oct. 6 HOD and her amendment naming DCI should relate back to the original timely filing	DCI argued the amended complaint was filed after the IDEA 90-day appeal period and thus time-barred	The amendment related back under Rule 15(c); the amended complaint is within the IDEA limitations period (relief for Lemus)
Exhaustion of administrative remedies	Lemus contends she presented the same claims to OSSE and exhausted IDEA administrative remedies	DCI argued Lemus failed to exhaust administrative remedies for some claims	Court found Lemus plausibly alleged exhaustion; exhaustion requirement met for the surviving IDEA claims
Title VI national-origin / language-discrimination claim	Lemus alleged failure to provide Spanish translations and ESL services discriminated against her and her son on national-origin grounds	DCI argued plaintiff failed to allege intentional discrimination required for a private Title VI claim; language deficits alone do not show national-origin intent	Court dismissed Title VI claims for failure to plausibly allege intentional discrimination; disparate-impact/regulatory violations are not privately actionable under Title VI
Service of process / personal jurisdiction in DCI’s appeal of the FAPE HOD	Lemus moved to quash for late service and lack of personal jurisdiction	DCI argued service was delayed by only a few days, had good cause, and the limitations period would bar refiling	Court found good cause for the brief delay, declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, ordered Lemus to respond to DCI’s stay motion, and administratively stayed the HOD pending decision

Key Cases Cited

Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (IDEA statutory framework and FAPE basics)
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (U.S. 1982) (FAPE standard: personalized instruction and sufficient supports)
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (U.S. 2010) (Rule 15(c) relation-back inquiry for amended complaints)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth)
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (U.S. 2001) (private Title VI suits require intentional discrimination, not disparate impact)
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1974) (historical recognition of language-related barriers, later limited by Sandoval)
Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High School, 618 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2010) (language-proficiency policies do not automatically equate to national-origin discrimination)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)