Lemuel Anthony McNeil v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8963

In December 2001 Harris County firefighters found McNeil conscious but smoke-logged and the infant daughter dead in his home; he was indicted for capital murder and arson, acquitted on capital murder, convicted on arson and deadly-weapon charge with 23-year sentence.
McNeil and Stephanie Flournoy had a brief relationship; she became pregnant, McNeil objected to the pregnancy, and custody proceedings followed, with the family court denying his sole custody request and ordering visitation.
On December 15, 2001, McNeil’s friend Reid helped with the child visit; they lit a fireplace fire at McNeil’s home while the child slept; later, EMS reported McNeil could not speak due to smoke and the infant was found dead in the living room.
Arson origin investigations varied: initial HFD findings suggested possible ignition near a baseboard and a closed flue; later investigators and insurers disagreed, with tests and dog alerts shifting views toward incendiary origins.
Defense experts offered alternative accidental-fire theories; the State presented accelerant evidence and motive related to the child’s death in its case; trial court limited evidence about the child but allowed some motive-related testimony.
McNeil asserted collateral estoppel concerns related to the capital murder acquittal, challenging admission of child-death evidence, and sought a special plea in bar; the record discusses joinder and consolidation under the Penal Code.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Collateral estoppel on deadly weapon	McNeil argues acquittal bars relitigation of deadly weapon use.	State asserts acquittal did not decide all elements and may coexist with arson proof.	Not barred; collateral estoppel did not foreclose the deadly-weapon charge.
Admissibility of child-death evidence	Evidence about the child’s death is irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial.	Evidence relevant to motive and credibility; admissible with limiting instructions.	Admissible with reasonable limits; not an abuse of discretion.
Special plea in bar (former jeopardy)	Consolidation was mandatory; should have submitted plea.	Joinder/consolidation permissive; not mandatory; Stevens precedent controls.	Special plea not required to be submitted; court did not abuse discretion.
Evidentiary sufficiency of arson conviction	Evidence insufficient to prove arson beyond reasonable doubt.	Evidence, including accelerants and ignition patterns, supports guilt.	Sufficient: rational jury could find McNeil started a fire with intent to damage/destroy home.
Admission of capital-murder acquittal during punishment	Acquittal should be admissible to inform sentencing.	Acquittal may confuse jury and is not relevant to sentencing goals.	Exclusion of acquittal during punishment was not an abuse of discretion.

Ex parte McNeil, 223 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) (collateral estoppel in habeas context; double jeopardy linkage)
Ex parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (test for collateral estoppel in criminal trials)
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1990) (acquittal does not bar evidence of same event in later prosecution)
Mims v. State, 335 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) (deadly weapon findings may attach to arson without duplicating capital-murder elements)
Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (joinder/consolidation not mandatory despite 3.02; 27.05 does not trump)