Lemmi, A. v. Lemmi, K.
Lemmi, A. v. Lemmi, K. No. 709 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jun 1, 2017Background
- Ann Marie Lemmi and Kevin Lemmi divorced in 1994; their stipulation required Husband to convey 10 acres of his Hanover Township farm to their son Jimmy when Jimmy turned 18.
- The divorce decree incorporated the stipulation but did not expressly state it was "not merged."
- Jimmy turned 18 on January 18, 2000; Husband never conveyed the land.
- Appellant (mother) filed a petition to enforce the stipulation on June 29, 2015, more than 15 years after the alleged breach.
- The trial court denied relief as time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations for contracts; Appellant appealed, preserving two issues (continuing-duty/continuing-contract theory and whether the stipulation merged into the decree such that no statute of limitations applies).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Husband owed continuing duties such that the contract was "continuing" and the SOL did not bar enforcement | The stipulation created continuing duties (citing Crispo, Miller, K.A.R.), so the SOL did not run or ran from contract termination | The stipulation imposed a one‑time obligation (conveyance at age 18), not a continuing contract; SOL therefore applies | Court: Not a continuing contract; even if continuing, latest termination (age 22 benefit) ended by 2002 so 4‑yr SOL expired well before 2015; claim time‑barred |
| Whether the stipulation merged into the divorce decree so it became a court order immune from the contractual SOL | Because the stipulation was incorporated and merged into the decree, it is a court order and not subject to the contract SOL | The decree incorporated but did not expressly merge the stipulation; parties did not intend ongoing court supervision, so it remained an independent contract | Court: The stipulation was incorporated but not merged; it remained an independent contract governed by contract law and the 4‑yr SOL |
| Standing of Appellant to bring enforcement on behalf of Son | Appellant maintains she has standing to enforce on Son's behalf | Husband did not contest standing below | Court: Standing issues not preserved for appeal (waived) — not reached on merits |
| Fraud/concealment and equitable tolling based on fiduciary duties | Appellant asserted concealment of leases and fiduciary duties tolling SOL | Husband disputed; these theories were not raised below | Court: These issues were waived for appellate review because not raised in trial court |
Key Cases Cited
- Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. 2006) (continuing payment obligations can create a continuing contract)
- Miller v. Miller, 983 A.2d 736 (Pa. Super. 2009) (installment/mortgage/tax obligations without fixed term may render an agreement continuing)
- K.A.R. v. T.G.L., 107 A.3d 770 (Pa. Super. 2014) (tests for whether an agreement is continuing and when SOL runs)
- Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251 (Pa. Super. 2005) (marital settlement agreements interpreted under contract law unless they survive/merge into decree)
- Jones v. Jones, 651 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. 1994) (merger vs. incorporation—key is parties' intent and decree language)
- McMahon v. McMahon, 612 A.2d 1360 (Pa. Super. 1992) (incorporation without rejecting merger indicates survival; enforcement as contract rather than court order depends on decree language)
- GAI Consultants, Inc. v. Homestead Borough, 120 A.3d 417 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (statute of limitations for a continuing contract may run from contract termination)