LeKeysia Wilson v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Svcs.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3683
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- LaKeysia Wilson, an African-American DHS employee, was promoted to program supervisor in March 2014 after being urged to apply by her caucasian supervisor, Patricia Robins.
- After earlier discipline of another Black employee (Sharon Meeks), Robins allegedly began criticizing Wilson; Wilson was offered demotion or termination on June 30 and stripped of supervisory duties July 2.
- Wilson filed an EEOC charge on September 8, 2014; shortly thereafter DHS placed her on a PIP (Sept. 30) and issued a written warning (Oct. 7); DHS terminated her October 22, 2014.
- Wilson filed a second EEOC charge the day after termination alleging retaliation for her earlier charge and racial discrimination; she sued DHS for disparate treatment, retaliation, and harassment.
- The district court dismissed the harassment claim as time-barred and dismissed disparate treatment and retaliation claims for failure to state a claim; the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of disparate treatment but reversed dismissal of retaliation and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wilson pleaded disparate treatment on account of race | Wilson: she was disciplined (written warning) for work a white coworker did not do, showing disparate treatment | DHS: plaintiff failed to allege that the white employee received lesser or no discipline; non-actionable written warning | Affirmed dismissal — plaintiff failed to allege actual disparate treatment (no comparison showing differential discipline) |
| Whether Wilson pleaded a plausible Title VII retaliation claim | Wilson: filed EEOC charge and was terminated six weeks later; complaint alleges she was a "victim of retaliation," PIP and warnings part of retaliation | DHS: adverse actions preceded the EEOC filing and show a performance-based progressive-discipline explanation; temporal proximity alone insufficient | Reversed dismissal — court finds the complaint, taken as whole, plausibly alleges but-for causation given timing and context; remanded |
| What pleading standard applies to retaliation after Nassar/Iqbal/Twombly | Wilson: need not plead full prima facie McDonnell case; plausibility standard governs | DHS: but-for causation (Nassar) and Iqbal plausibility require more than temporal proximity; pre-existing discipline undermines causation | Court: Nassar's but-for standard applies, but under Twombly/Iqbal a complaint that plausibly alleges but-for causation can survive; here pleadings suffice |
| Whether pre-existing performance actions are an "obvious alternative explanation" negating plausibility | Wilson: PIP and warnings can themselves be acts of retaliation; employer’s stated reasons are not detailed enough to be obvious, lawful alternatives | DHS: progressive discipline began before EEOC filing, so that is the obvious lawful explanation | Court: pre-existing discipline facts do not constitute an "obvious alternative explanation" at pleading stage; dismissal reversed on retaliation claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (temporal proximity must be "very close" to show causation)
- Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1994) (dissimilar discipline can defeat summary judgment in discrimination cases)
- Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2005) (certain administrative actions may not be adverse employment actions)
- Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2016) (detailed factual attachments can defeat plausibility where misconduct is clearly explained)
- Dunbar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 709 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 2013) (de novo review of 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Turner v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2005) (temporal proximity can be circumstantial evidence of causation)
- Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (complaint read as whole; plaintiff need not rule out lawful explanations at pleading stage)