Lekettey v. City of New York
637 F. App'x 659
2d Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Kayla Lekettey, a provisional Assistant Landscape Architect for NYC Parks, alleged sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII against the City, Parks Dept., and individual supervisors.
- Alleged conduct: coworker Svetlana Filipovich “fondled” Lekettey and allegedly continued to harass her; Lekettey reported the conduct to Parks’ Equal Employment Office.
- Parks’ EEO investigated, found probable cause, and accommodated Lekettey by moving her workstation away from Filipovich.
- Over a year after the alleged fondling, Lekettey was terminated when her provisional position ended; she alleged termination was retaliatory/pretextual.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c); the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim; the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff pleaded quid pro quo sexual harassment | Lekettey alleged she was fondled and explicitly rejected advances, implying denial of economic benefit tied to rejection | Defendants argued no allegation Filipovich was a supervisor or that rejection was connected to termination | Dismissed — complaint lacks nonconclusory facts linking the alleged advance/rejection to any tangible employment action or supervisory status |
| Whether plaintiff pleaded hostile work environment | Alleged physical fondling and continued harassment created an abusive environment | Defendants argued no facts imputing Filipovich’s conduct to the employer (no supervisory status; employer responded) | Dismissed — even if harassment severe, no plausible allegation employer is liable (no supervisor power alleged and employer investigated/made accommodations) |
| Whether termination was retaliatory | Lekettey asserted termination was pretext for retaliation after complaining | Defendants stated termination was the natural end of a provisional position | Dismissed — complaint admits termination was because provisional post ended; no plausible facts showing pretext or retaliatory motive |
| Whether pleadings met Rule 8/Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard | Plaintiff urged claims should survive given allegations of touching, complaint, and termination | Defendants urged that allegations are conclusory and fail to permit a reasonable inference of liability | Dismissed — court applied Twombly/Iqbal and found allegations conclusory and insufficient to raise plausible discriminatory/retaliatory inference |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (standard for reviewing dismissals under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c))
- LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (pleading standards and inferences on dismissal)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations not entitled to assumption of truth)
- Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (Title VII pleading elements: adverse action and protected characteristic as motivating factor)
- Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (plausible support for minimal inference of discriminatory motive)
- Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992) (quid pro quo harassment requires nexus between rejected advance and denial of economic benefit)
- Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (elements of hostile work environment and employer liability)