Leja v. Community Unit School District 300
979 N.E.2d 573
Ill. App. Ct.2012Background
- Plaintiff Allison Leja, a high school student, was injured in the gym when a volleyball net crank either broke loose or snapped back and struck her face.
- Plaintiff sued the district in two counts: count I for negligence and count II for willful and wanton conduct.
- The trial court dismissed count I as immune under 745 ILCS 10/3-106 and count II for failure to plead willful and wanton conduct; both dismissals were with prejudice.
- The immunity issue is governed by 745 ILCS 10/3-106, which shields public entities from liability for recreational property unless willful and wanton conduct proximately causes the injury.
- On appeal, Leja challenges only the dismissal of count II, arguing that warning labels and instructions put the district on notice of a high risk of injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warning labels and instructions establish willful and wanton conduct. | Leja argues labels and manuals show utter indifference to safety. | Leja contends warning alone is insufficient to show high risk of injury. | No; warning labels alone do not show conscious disregard. |
| Whether defendant had knowledge of dangerous conditions to show conscious disregard. | Leja asserts prior difficulties and crank’s tendencies show awareness of risk. | Defendant allegedly knew of prior difficulties but not a high-probability danger. | Insufficient facts; no evidence of knowledge of a risk likely to cause injury. |
| Whether instructing to operate the crank, given known dangers, supports willful and wanton conduct. | Instruction to operate the crank demonstrates utter indifference. | Instructing to use a labeled product does not alone prove willful conduct. | Not shown; instruction to use labeled equipment does not establish willful conduct. |
| Whether plaintiff can rely on Manuel or Peters to plead willful and wanton conduct. | Manuel/Peters show consciousness of danger when instructing to encounter dangerous conditions. | Those facts are distinguishable; here there is no minimally sufficient allegation of conscious danger. | Distinguishable; not sufficiently alleged here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Manuel v. Red Hill Community Unit School District No. 10 Bd. of Ed., 324 Ill. App. 3d 279 (2001) (requires some notice of danger to plead willful and wanton conduct)
- Peters v. Herrin Community Unit School District No. 4, 401 Ill. App. 3d 356 (2010) (consciousness of danger can be inferred from instructions about a dangerous path)
- Thurman v. Champaign Park District, 2011 IL App (4th) 101024 (2011) (warnings alone must show high probability of injury; knowledge of condition matters)
- Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629 (1995) (definition of willful and wanton conduct excludes mere inadvertence)
- Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 401 Ill. App. 3d 110 (2010) (course of action showing utter indifference or conscious disregard)
- Winfrey v. Chicago Park District, 274 Ill. App. 3d 939 (1995) (knowledge of a dangerous condition must be shown)