Lehigh Cement Co. v. David Quinn, in his capacity as Tax Assessor of the City of Providence, Rhode Island
173 A.3d 1272
| R.I. | 2017Background
- Lehigh Cement leased 3.65 acres at the Port of Providence but was billed and paid taxes as if it leased 16.8 acres for tax years 2006–2009, resulting in nearly $500,000 in alleged overpayments.
- Lehigh discovered the discrepancy in 2010 and met with the city tax assessor, who said he would review the matter and, if an error existed, provide tax credits going forward; city officials repeatedly told Lehigh they were "working on" the issue.
- Lehigh filed suit in Superior Court in December 2012 seeking: (1) correction/refund under R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-5-23; (2) relief under the Rhode Island Constitution’s fair-distribution clause (art. I, § 2); and (3) return of illegal taxes under § 44-5-27.
- The city moved for summary judgment; the Superior Court granted the motion, dismissing all three counts. Lehigh timely appealed.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed, holding that statutory text, precedent, and limitations doctrine foreclosed Lehigh’s claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 44-5-23 creates a private cause of action to obtain corrected assessments or refunds | § 44-5-23 allows the assessor to correct erroneous assessments and entitles Lehigh to a corrected assessment or refund/credit | § 44-5-23 is a municipal reassessment tool (six-year look-back) and does not create a taxpayer’s private refund remedy; administrative route governs | Court: § 44-5-23 does not provide a private refund remedy; it permits assessor reassessment, not taxpayer-initiated refunds — affirm dismissal of Count 1 |
| Whether the fair-distribution clause (art. I, § 2) provides relief for Lehigh’s alleged over-assessment | Lehigh contends the city failed to fairly distribute property-tax burdens by taxing it on acres it did not lease | City argues clause is precatory; constitutional provision generally does not create a private cause of action absent evidence of intentional or patently discriminatory assessments | Court: Clause is not a basis for relief here—no allegation/evidence of discriminatory or outrageous conduct; claim fails |
| Whether § 44-5-27 permits suit in Superior Court despite Lehigh filing more than three months after payment without penalty | Lehigh seeks equitable exceptions (discovery rule; equitable tolling) because it discovered the error in 2010 and relied on city assurances | City contends § 44-5-27’s three-month filing rule is mandatory and Lehigh missed it; statutory scheme requires finality in assessment disputes | Court: Even assuming discovery rule could apply, Lehigh discovered the error in 2010 and filed in 2012; city’s vague assurances do not justify equitable tolling; claim is time-barred — affirm dismissal of Count 3 |
Key Cases Cited
- Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific, LLC, 140 A.3d 100 (R.I. 2016) (standard for appellate review of summary judgment)
- In re Dorrance Street, 4 R.I. 230 (R.I. 1856) (fair-distribution clause is generally precatory and addressed to the legislature)
- Picerne v. DiPrete, 428 A.2d 1074 (R.I. 1981) (constitutional challenge sustained where assessments were intentionally selective and discriminatory)
- Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274 (R.I. 2011) (taxing statutes provide exclusive remedies; taxpayers may in limited circumstances proceed directly in Superior Court)
- Rivera v. Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 70 A.3d 905 (R.I. 2013) (equitable tolling may apply where an authoritative misstatement induced untimely filing)