Lehi City v. Rickabaugh, 487 P.3d 453

On January 26, 2018, Jason Rickabaugh sent at least 30 Facebook direct messages to a private citizen (Victim) criticizing the victim’s support for nearby mining/development; messages included vulgar insults and threats (e.g., “NOW YOU ARE #1 ON MY LIST OF PEOPLE TO DESTROY!”).
Victim reported feeling violated and threatened; police contacted Rickabaugh, who admitted sending the messages over a policy disagreement.
Lehi City charged Rickabaugh under Utah Code § 76-9-201(2)(a)(i), (b), and (c) (electronic communication harassment).
Rickabaugh moved to dismiss arguing the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague (facially and as applied); district court denied the motion, a jury convicted, and Rickabaugh appealed.
The Court of Appeals limited its review to subsection (2)(b) and held that (2)(b) is not facially overbroad, Rickabaugh’s as-applied overbreadth claim failed, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
The court emphasized the statute’s specific-intent requirement (intent to intimidate, abuse, threaten, harass, frighten, or disrupt) plus the element that insults/taunts/challenges be made “in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response,” which together sufficiently narrow the statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 76-9-201 is facially overbroad	City: statute targets unprotected conduct (e.g., fighting words) and requires specific intent, so it’s narrow	Rickabaugh: statute criminalizes protected speech; intent terms are broad and capture constitutionally protected expression	Subsection (2)(b) is not facially overbroad; any noninvalid subsection is sufficient to uphold conviction
Whether § 76-9-201 is overbroad as applied to Rickabaugh	City: applying the statute to vulgar, threatening direct messages is proper	Rickabaugh: jury may have relied on victim’s subjective offense; his speech is protected	As-applied overbreadth challenge fails; defendant did not distinguish it from his facial challenge
Whether § 76-9-201 is facially vague	City: scienter and objective likelihood standard give adequate notice	Rickabaugh: terms like "harass," "frighten," and "disrupt" are undefined and invite arbitrary enforcement	Court did not find facial vagueness controlling; scienter mitigates vagueness concerns
Whether § 76-9-201 is vague as applied to Rickabaugh	City: his messages plainly satisfy intent and objective-likelihood elements	Rickabaugh: victim’s circumstances could make the standard subjective	As-applied vagueness fails because his conduct was clearly proscribed under (2)(b)

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth doctrine—must be substantial relative to statute’s legitimate sweep)
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004) (standing limits in overbreadth challenges when a valid provision supports conviction)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (vagueness—plaintiffs who engage in clearly proscribed conduct cannot challenge vagueness on behalf of others)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (possibility of isolated unconstitutional applications insufficient to invalidate statute)
Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (state interest in protecting citizens from threatening or harmful behavior)
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987) (vagueness standard—statute must give ordinary reader sufficient notice)
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014) (specific intent requirement narrows statute to conduct with serious criminal intent)