874 N.W.2d 684
Mich.2016Background
- Michael Lego (plaintiff), a police officer, was shot by fellow officer Jake Liss (defendant) while both were attempting to apprehend an armed-robbery suspect.
- Lego and his spouse sued Liss in Wayne Circuit Court alleging gross negligence; Liss moved for summary disposition claiming statutory immunity under MCL 600.2966 (firefighter’s rule for governmental employees).
- The trial court denied summary disposition; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in part, concluding factual issues (e.g., violations of training/safety procedures) precluded a legal determination of immunity.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to address the scope of MCL 600.2966 and whether gross negligence defeats the immunity.
- The Supreme Court held that MCL 600.2966 immunizes governmental employees from tort liability for injuries to police officers that arise from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of the profession — including being shot by a fellow officer during an active-shooter engagement — and that immunity applies as a matter of law here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCL 600.2966 immunity is defeated by alleged gross negligence | Lego: If Liss acted with gross negligence or disregarded training/safety, immunity should not apply | Liss: Statutory immunity applies if the injury arose from normal, inherent, foreseeable risks regardless of degree of negligence | Held: Immunity applies as a matter of law; degree of recklessness does not defeat MCL 600.2966 when injury arises from those risks |
| Whether being shot by a fellow officer during an active-shooter engagement is a "normal, inherent, and foreseeable" risk | Lego: Not necessarily; facts may show an extraordinary risk if procedures were flagrantly violated | Liss: Such an event is within the normal, inherent, foreseeable risks of police work | Held: Such a shooting falls within the statutory phrase; therefore immunity covers it |
| Whether factual disputes about training/safety procedures preclude summary disposition | Lego: Allegations about violations create triable issues that defeat immunity at summary judgment | Liss: No material factual dispute changes whether the injury arose from occupational risks under the statute | Held: No unresolved material fact on the statutory question; summary disposition appropriate for defendant |
| Whether prior federal decisions or common-law firefighter’s rule control interpretation | Lego: Relied on analogous authorities suggesting exceptions | Liss: Statute governs; common-law rule abolished and lower federal decisions are not binding | Held: Statutory language controls; prior federal or common-law interpretations do not override MCL 600.2966 |
Key Cases Cited
- Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347 (Mich. 1987) (discusses the historical common-law firefighter’s rule; referenced in statutory-context discussion)
- Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 603 (Mich. 2004) (lower federal court decisions are not binding on Michigan courts; cited to reject reliance on federal district precedent)