Leftenant v. Blackmon
2:18-cv-01948-EJY
| D. Nev. | Mar 4, 2022Background
- This is a dispute among former and current members of the funk band CAMEO over ownership and use of the CAMEO trademarks, distribution of performance/featured-artist royalties, and related state and federal claims. Plaintiffs are Nathan (N.) Leftenant, Arnett (A.) Leftenant, Jeryl Bright, Gregory Johnson, and Thomas (Tomi) Jenkins; Defendant is Lawrence (Larry) Blackmon.
- SoundExchange and AARC royalty accounts were contested beginning in 2011–2013; SoundExchange froze distributions in July 2013 after competing claims; some plaintiffs registered with SoundExchange/AARC at different times.
- Plaintiffs (four originally filed Oct. 10, 2018; Jenkins added later) sued Blackmon; Blackmon counterclaimed for trademark infringement, false designations, and deceptive trade practices. Blackmon registered the CAMEO mark for live performances with the USPTO on March 28, 2017; he claims common-law rights in the sound-recording mark.
- In 2016 Plaintiffs N. Leftenant, A. Leftenant, Johnson, and Bright released the single “We In The House” under the CAMEO name while a trademark application by some Plaintiffs was pending; Jenkins did not participate in that recording and continued performing with CAMEO into 2018.
- Major disputed factual issues: who continuously used and controlled the CAMEO marks after early departures (1981–1982), whether individual Plaintiffs retained co-ownership, and whether alleged acts were time‑barred or barred by laches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tortious interference with SoundExchange/AARC contracts | Plaintiffs: Blackmon interfered with their royalty contracts and distributions. | Blackmon: claims accrued years earlier; no interference during limitations period; some plaintiffs lacked AARC contracts or notice; mediation refusal not a contract breach. | Court: Grant summary judgment for Blackmon — Plaintiffs’ interference claims are time‑barred or fail for lack of contract/evidence. |
| Ownership / co‑ownership of CAMEO marks | Plaintiffs: multiple members are co‑owners of CAMEO marks. | Blackmon: he (and for some periods only he) owns exclusive rights; registrant for live mark; ex‑members lost rights when they ceased continuous use. | Court: Mixed. Jenkins co‑owned until his 2016 performance agreement (co‑ownership before that); N. Leftenant co‑owned through 2005 with a factual dispute after; Bright, Johnson, A. Leftenant lost co‑ownership after their departures (1981–82). |
| Federal trademark claims (§32 vs §43(a)) | Plaintiffs: challenge Blackmon’s claims; argue continuing wrongs. | Blackmon: asserts §32 (registered mark) and §43(a)/common‑law claims; §32 only applies post‑registration; laches/time bars apply to some claims. | Court: §32 claims limited to post‑registration acts (March 28, 2017) and fail as to Plaintiffs who had no live performances after registration; §43(a)/common‑law claims survive as to 2016 sound‑recording use (material facts on likelihood of confusion/intent remain). Laches bars some live‑performance claims (e.g., N. Leftenant). |
| Deceptive trade practices (NRS) | Plaintiffs: deny knowingly false representations. | Blackmon: Plaintiffs knowingly misrepresented membership/use of CAMEO. | Court: Mixed. Summary judgment denied as to Jenkins and N. Leftenant (questions of fact); granted for Bright on live‑performance theory (no evidence of unauthorized live use); denied as to Bright/Johnson/A. Leftenant for the 2016 recording (factual issues remain). |
| Declaratory judgment of co‑ownership (Plaintiffs’ Count V) | Plaintiffs seek declaration of co‑ownership. | Blackmon opposes, contending Plaintiffs lack ongoing rights after they left. | Court: Granted for Bright, Johnson, A. Leftenant (they have no ownership after departure); denied for N. Leftenant (material factual dispute post‑2005) and denied for Jenkins for post‑2016 period (disputed effect of his 2016 contract). |
Key Cases Cited
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (summary judgment standard; draw inferences for nonmoving party)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (summary judgment and genuine‑issue standard)
- Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1996) (priority of use and common‑law trademark ownership)
- AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) (eight‑factor likelihood‑of‑confusion test)
- Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (trademark infringement/confusion framework)
- Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (departing band members do not automatically retain trademark rights)
- Commodores Ent. Corp. v. McClary, 879 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 2018) (ownership issues when group membership evolves)
- Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 744 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2014) (continuing use requirement for common‑law mark)
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002) (laches and analogous statute of limitations in trademark cases)
- Kendall‑Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E & J Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) (§32 claims limited to registered‑mark periods)