Lees v. Graduate Center, City University of New York
696 F. App'x 530
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Carol Lees was employed by CUNY’s Graduate Center and alleged a course of adverse actions culminating in her termination.
- Lees asserted claims under Title IX, FMLA, New York State and City human rights laws; on appeal she challenges only the dismissal of her Title IX retaliation claim and denial of leave to amend.
- Lees alleges hostility from a colleague (Ms. Bishop) and that CUNY ceased cooperating with her visa application; she did not allege protected activity until over a year after those alleged adverse actions began.
- The District Court dismissed Lees’s Title IX retaliation claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly plead causation and denied leave to amend as futile.
- The Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal and denial of leave to amend de novo and affirmed, finding no direct or circumstantial evidence linking Lees’s protected activity to the adverse employment actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lees pleaded a prima facie Title IX retaliation claim (causation) | Lees contended adverse actions were retaliatory because she complained about discrimination | CUNY argued no causal link: protected activity occurred long after adverse actions began and no direct evidence of retaliatory animus | Held: No. Complaint fails to plead causation; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) affirmed |
| Whether temporal proximity or other circumstantial evidence supports inference of retaliation | Lees relied on timing and course of adverse treatment to infer retaliation | CUNY noted adverse, gradual actions began well before any protected activity, so timing cannot support inference | Held: Timing insufficient; Slattery rule applies—no inference of retaliation |
| Whether complaint contained direct evidence of retaliatory animus | Lees asserted hostility by a supervisor and CUNY’s actions toward her visa | CUNY argued allegations do not show retaliatory animus directed at Lees | Held: No direct evidence alleged; causation not established |
| Whether leave to amend should be granted | Lees sought to add the date of an oral complaint to establish timing | CUNY argued amendment would be futile because the alleged complaint still postdates adverse actions | Held: Denied as futile; amendment would not cure causation defect |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: factual matter plausibly suggesting entitlement to relief)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87 (temporal proximity alone insufficient when adverse actions predate protected activity)
- Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111 (direct and indirect causation frameworks for retaliation)
- Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81 (causal connection requirement for Title IX retaliation)
- Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243 (futility as a basis to deny leave to amend)
- Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66 (Rule 12(b)(6) review standard)
- Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (de novo review of denial of leave to amend based on futility)
- Chase Group All. LLC v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146 (pleading and inference drawing at motion to dismiss)
- Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 F.3d 107 (construing complaints liberally on dismissal)