LeeAnn Brock v. United States
887 F.3d 298
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- LeeAnn Brock‑Miller pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and accepted a binding 10‑year sentence and 8 years supervised release, waiving direct appeal and most collateral challenges.
- The government filed a §851 information alleging a 2008 Indiana conviction (possession of syringes) as a predicate "felony drug offense," which would trigger a statutory recidivist enhancement doubling certain mandatory minimums.
- Brock‑Miller’s counsel objected but cited the wrong Indiana statute and never pursued a meritorious challenge to the actual predicate statute (Ind. Code §16‑42‑19‑18, the Legend Drug Act as in effect in 2007).
- The district court relied on an amended (post‑2007) version of the Indiana statute and concluded the prior conviction qualified as a felony drug offense, denied a §2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, and upheld the waiver because the plea was deemed knowing and voluntary.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the district court erred: the 2007 Indiana statute covered only "legend" (prescription) drugs, not heroin, so the prior conviction did not qualify under the federal definition of "felony drug offense" in 21 U.S.C. §802(44).
- The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland/Hill: whether counsel’s failure to identify and press the meritorious §851 objection was deficient and prejudiced Brock‑Miller’s plea decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brock‑Miller’s 2008 Indiana syringe conviction qualifies as a federal "felony drug offense" under 21 U.S.C. §802(44) | The 2007 Indiana Legend Drug Act regulated only prescription (legend) drugs, not controlled substances like heroin, so the conviction does not qualify | Government argued Indiana cases and statutory history made the conviction appear to fit within §802(44) and relied on earlier case assumptions | Held: Not a qualifying felony drug offense; district court erred by analyzing the amended statute rather than the 2007 version |
| Whether counsel’s performance during plea negotiations was constitutionally deficient (Strickland first prong) | Counsel failed to investigate conviction records, cited wrong statute, filed frivolous §851 objection, overestimated exposure, and advised acceptance of plea containing an unwarranted enhancement | Government conceded some mistakes but argued errors were not egregious enough to meet Strickland | Held: Allegations, if proven, are sufficient to show possible deficient performance; remand for evidentiary hearing |
| Whether Brock‑Miller was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors (Strickland second prong / Hill/Frye standards) | But for counsel’s errors, she would have rejected the plea or negotiated a better one; without the erroneous enhancement she had greater trial leverage | Government contended it would not have offered a better deal and challenged prejudice showing | Held: Court concluded Brock‑Miller stated sufficient facts to justify a hearing on prejudice (reasonable probability she would have declined plea or obtained better terms); remanded for hearing |
| Whether the plea waiver bars §2255 relief based on counsel errors in plea negotiations | Waiver does not bar a collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance related to the negotiation of the plea | Government relied on waiver to foreclose relief | Held: If deficient performance in plea negotiations is proven, waiver will not bar §2255 relief; district court should not enforce waiver without resolving deficiency claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (U.S. 2012) (counsel effectiveness standard in plea negotiations; prejudice framework)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (U.S. 2012) (counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers and critical phase protection)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance claims affecting guilty pleas)
- Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124 (U.S. 2008) (§802(44) is the exclusive definition of "felony drug offense")
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) (failure to advise on clear, important collateral consequence can be deficient)
- Gaylord v. United States, 829 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2016) (counsel’s failure to investigate forensic proof supporting enhancement can constitute deficient performance)
- Spiller v. United States, 855 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2017) (counsel must learn facts and estimate likely sentence before plea)
- Moore v. Bryant, 348 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 2003) (deficient advice about a plea based on failure to analyze relevant facts and law)