Lee v. Smith, II, 307 Ga. 815

Plaintiff David A. Smith II, a collegiate/professional high jumper, was injured in a 2012 car collision; defendant Donggue Lee admitted fault. Smith initially did not claim future lost wages in his 2014 complaint or early discovery responses.
Smith supplemented discovery after post‑injury developments (including 2017 surgery), identifying his sports agent and asserting diminished future earning capacity; he said he might call an economist if needed.
The trial court entered a consent scheduling order (April 2017) requiring witness identification by May 12 and set an August trial date. Smith identified agent Lamont Dagen on the final day.
Lee timely deposed Dagen and then identified a rebuttal expert; the trial court excluded Lee’s expert solely because the expert had not been identified before the scheduling deadline.
At trial Smith’s expert testimony on future earnings went unrebutted; jury returned a $2,000,000 verdict for Smith. The Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion; Lee obtained certiorari review in the Georgia Supreme Court.
The Georgia Supreme Court held exclusion solely for untimely identification is improper, articulated a four‑factor test for late disclosures, reversed in part, and remanded for reconsideration under the articulated factors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May a court exclude an expert solely because the witness was identified after a scheduling/deadline?	Court should enforce scheduling orders; exclusion is an appropriate sanction for noncompliance.	Exclusion cannot rest only on untimeliness; court must consider surrounding circumstances.	No. Exclusion solely for late identification is an abuse of discretion.
If exclusion is improper, what factors must the trial court consider before excluding a late‑identified witness?	Trial court has broad discretion to sanction discovery violations to vindicate its orders.	Court should balance circumstances: reason for delay, importance, prejudice, and lesser remedies before excluding.	Trial courts must consider: (1) explanation for failure to disclose, (2) importance of the testimony, (3) prejudice to opposing party, and (4) whether a less harsh remedy would suffice.

Ambler v. Archer, 230 Ga. 281 (1973) (trial court should not impose sanctions harsher than necessary to vindicate its authority)
Carder v. Racine Enterprises, 261 Ga. 142 (1991) (preclusion as sanction can be abuse of discretion when less severe remedies exist)
Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (four‑factor approach: explanation, importance, prejudice, availability of continuance)
Knight v. Miami‑Dade County, 856 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2017) (evaluate explanation, importance, and prejudice when excluding late witnesses)
The Kroger Co. v. Walters, 319 Ga. App. 52 (2012) (exclusion solely for untimely identification is improper)
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (remand for reconsideration under the proper legal standard may obviate need for a new trial)