366 F. Supp. 3d 980
N.D. Ohio2019Background
- Sarah Lee sued NEA and several school officials seeking injunctive relief and recovery of past-collected fair-share (agency) fees after Janus v. AFSCME.
- Lee sought leave to amend; the Court granted amendment and considered dismissal motions against the amended complaint.
- Lee did not oppose dismissal of individual defendants and the Avon Lake City School District; those defendants were dismissed.
- NEA moved to dismiss the remaining claims; the Court analyzed mootness and the union’s good-faith defense under binding Supreme Court precedent.
- The Court concluded NEA immediately ceased collecting agency fees after Janus and that collections made under Abood were made in good faith reliance on existing precedent.
- The Court dismissed Lee’s complaint in its entirety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of injunctive relief after Janus | Lee: NEA’s voluntary cessation does not render claim moot; courts have refused mootness post-Obergefell | NEA: Janus invalidated all state-authorized agency fees; NEA ceased collection, so no ongoing injury | Court: Claim for injunction is moot because Janus broadly prohibited extraction of agency fees and NEA stopped collecting |
| Recovering past-paid fees / §1983 damages and good-faith defense | Lee: NEA must disprove subjective bad faith or factual violations of Abood to defeat refund/damage claims | NEA: Collections were made under controlling Abood precedent; reliance was objectively in good faith as a matter of law | Court: Collections under Abood were good-faith reliance as a matter of law; no basis to open discovery; damages/refund claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (held that public-sector unions may not extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees)
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (previously permitted collection of agency fees from nonmembers for collective bargaining activities)
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (example of a decision where mootness analysis post-decision differed when specific state statutes were not directly invalidated)