Lee v. Corsini
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1147
1st Cir.2015Background
- In 1976 Lee was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Angel Santos Davila; the Massachusetts SJC affirmed on direct appeal in 1981.
- Over decades Lee filed multiple motions for a new trial; a single justice of the SJC in 2006 declined review under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, finding most claims not "new and substantial."
- In 2004 (through new counsel) Lee raised extensive claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of his first postconviction counsel (the 1989 lawyer). He also sought discovery.
- Lee filed a federal habeas petition in 2007 asserting those same claims; the district court (2013) held the trial-ineffectiveness and Brady/prosecutorial claims procedurally defaulted under § 33E and denied relief and discovery.
- The First Circuit held the trial-ineffectiveness and prosecutorial-misconduct claims are procedurally defaulted; it ruled the postconviction-counsel ineffective-assistance claim was not procedurally defaulted but is precluded from habeas relief by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).
Issues
| Issue | Lee's Argument | Corsini's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim is procedurally defaulted under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E | Single justice treated claim as "arguably new" and analyzed merits; Lee says not defaulted | State asserts § 33E denial bars federal review | Not procedurally defaulted — single justice decided the claim on the merits (newness unresolved) |
| Whether habeas relief may be granted on the postconviction-counsel claim | Lee argues ineffective postconviction counsel caused default and entitles him to relief | Corsini cites 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) barring habeas relief based on postconviction counsel ineffectiveness | Relief barred by § 2254(i) despite claim not procedurally defaulted |
| Whether trial-ineffectiveness and prosecutorial-misconduct claims are reviewable on the merits (cause/prejudice or miscarriage of justice) | Lee contends cause shown by ineffective postconviction counsel and by state's failure to produce documents; alternatively actual innocence | State argues Martinez/Trevino exceptions don't apply in Massachusetts; government production issues don't show cause that prevented earlier raising | Claims are procedurally defaulted; Martinez/Trevino inapplicable; Lee failed to show cause and prejudice or actual-innocence miscarriage of justice |
| Whether district court erred in denying discovery | Lee argues discovery needed to develop Brady and other claims | Corsini points to lack of certificate of appealability on discovery and procedural posture | Issue waived—district court's COA did not cover discovery; appellate review declined |
Key Cases Cited
- Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing precedents about state-law procedural bars and habeas review)
- Costa v. Hall, 673 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (single-justice § 33E determinations can constitute independent state grounds barring federal review)
- Phoenix v. Matesanz, 189 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999) (single-justice merits resolution can permit federal review when decision is interwoven with federal law)
- Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2011) (distinguishing when a § 33E "new but not substantial" finding is a merits decision rather than procedural default)
- Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999) (procedural waiver under § 33E is an independent and adequate state ground)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (ineffective assistance in collateral proceedings generally cannot establish cause for procedural default)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2012) (narrow exception allowing postconviction counsel ineffectiveness to supply cause where state law requires initial-review collateral proceeding for trial-ineffectiveness claims)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (U.S. 2013) (extends Martinez to systems where structure effectively prevents meaningful direct-review presentation of trial-ineffectiveness claims)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
