LEE v. BUENO, 381 P.3d 736

Background

Lee sued Bueno for personal injuries from a 2014 motor-vehicle collision; Lee claimed about $10,154 in medical expenses and alleged total damages over $26,000. Lee's insurer (Blue Cross Blue Shield) was billed $8,112.81 and paid $2,845.11.
Before discovery, Lee filed a declaratory-judgment motion challenging the constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 § 3009.1 (which limits admissible medical-cost evidence to amounts actually paid or owed, not amounts billed). Trial court denied relief and certified the interlocutory order for appeal; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The statutory text at issue (12 O.S. 2011 § 3009.1) admits at trial amounts actually paid or, with provider statement or lien, amounts owed; if unpaid, Medicare rates may be admitted with a provider statement. A 2015 amendment (not applicable here) modified and added a fallback allowing billed amounts if pretrial requirements are unmet.
Lee challenged § 3009.1 as: an unconstitutional special law (Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46); a violation of access-to-courts and jury-trial rights (art. 2, §§ 6 & 19); a due-process violation (art. 2, § 7); a separation-of-powers violation (art. 4, § 1) for encroaching on evidentiary rules; and an unlawful abrogation of the collateral-source rule.
The Court reviewed de novo, emphasizing the heavy presumption in favor of statutory constitutionality and that legislative changes to rules of evidence are within legislative authority unless clearly unconstitutional.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3009.1 is an unconstitutional special law under art. 5, § 46	Lee: statute creates impermissible subclasses (insured v. uninsured; provider decisions) and treats similarly situated tort claimants differently	Statute applies uniformly to all personal-injury plaintiffs and standardizes admissible proof to amounts paid/owed to avoid windfalls	Court: Not a special law; applies uniformly and aims to prevent inequality, so constitutional
Whether § 3009.1 denies access to courts or jury trial rights (art. 2, §§ 6 & 19)	Lee: limiting admissible evidence effectively restricts jury’s ability to award full damages and limits access	Statute regulates admissibility of evidence but does not bar filing claims or deny jury factfinding; evidence rules are permissible	Court: No violation; evidence limits do not deny access or the right to jury trial
Whether § 3009.1 violates due process (art. 2, § 7)	Lee: (1) restricts insured plaintiffs’ evidence, (2) deprives a vested property interest (value of insurer-negotiated write-downs), (3) creates unequal treatment	Defs: statute applies to all plaintiffs equally; no vested property right shown; evidentiary rules do not offend due process	Court: No due-process violation; arguments unsupported and largely recycle special-law claim
Whether § 3009.1 infringes separation of powers (art. 4, § 1) by usurping judicial factfinding	Lee: Legislature cannot dictate evidentiary facts or predetermine adjudicative outcomes	Legislature has authority to set rules of evidence; statute does not predetermine adjudicative facts	Court: No separation-of-powers violation; Legislature may modify rules of evidence
Whether § 3009.1 unlawfully abolishes the collateral-source rule	Lee: collateral-source rule should protect billed amounts even if later written down	Defs: Legislature may limit admissible evidence; § 3009.1 does not eliminate collateral-source doctrine generally but controls where conflict exists	Court: § 3009.1 abrogates common-law collateral-source effect only to the extent it conflicts with the statute; statute controls

Key Cases Cited

Montgomery v. Potter, 341 P.3d 660 (Okla. 2014) (statute limiting recovery by uninsured motorists created unconstitutional special class)
Zeier v. Zimmer, 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006) (affidavit-of-merit requirement for medical-malpractice claims impermissible special law)
Wall v. Marouk, 302 P.3d 775 (Okla. 2013) (affidavit requirement created a new subclass and violated art. 5, § 46)
Gowens v. Barstow, 364 P.3d 644 (Okla. 2015) (acknowledged § 3009.1’s controlling effect over collateral-source questions in some contexts)
Gilbert v. Security Fin. Corp. of Okla., 152 P.3d 165 (Okla. 2006) (discussion of judicial review of damages and statutory restraints on jury discretion)
Denco Bus. Lines v. Hargis, 229 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1951) (recognition of the collateral-source rule under Oklahoma law)
Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011) (collateral-source rule does not protect billed-but-not-liable amounts)