Lee Roy Swafford v. United States
839 F.3d 1365
11th Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Lee Roy Swafford fell down a wooden stairway at Campsite 26 in the R. Shaefer Heard Campground, owned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), and sued the United States under the FTCA alleging negligent maintenance/inspection.
- The Corps operates the campground within a federal project; it charges campsite and visitor fees (per vehicle, varied by electrical amperage) to defray utilities/services; federal law forbids charging entrance/admission fees but allows use fees for developed sites.
- Since 2005 the Corps contracted Anderson Construction to perform inspection, maintenance, and repair of campsites and stairways, under contract direction and applicable standards.
- District court granted summary judgment for the Government, finding (1) the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA barred liability for decisions not to inspect/repair, and (2) Georgia’s Recreational Property Act (RPA) limited landowner liability because the Corps’ fees were not admission charges.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed the discretionary-function ruling (FTCA exception did not apply) but affirmed dismissal on state-law grounds, holding the Corps’ campsite/visitor fees were not ‘‘charges for admission’’ under Georgia’s RPA, so recovery is barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of FTCA discretionary-function exception | Corps’ failure to inspect/repair stairs is not protected policy judgment; once Corps operated the stairs it had a duty to maintain (Indian Towing analogy) | Corps’ supervision/acceptance of contractor work is discretionary and protected | Exception does not apply; negligent maintenance/acceptance of unsafe stairs is not a permissible policy choice |
| Scope of contractor liability/respondeat superior under FTCA | Corps exercised control over Anderson, so Anderson’s negligence is imputable to the United States | Independent-contractor rule limits Government liability for contractor negligence | Material fact dispute existed below about Anderson’s status; court did not resolve due to RPA ruling |
| Application of Georgia’s Recreational Property Act (RPA) — are campsite/visitor fees admission charges? | Fees required to access campground effectively function as admission charges, defeating RPA immunity | Fees are per-vehicle/use-based to defray utilities/services (not admission); federal law prohibits admission fees and authorizes use fees | Fees are not admission charges under RPA; RPA bars recovery against landowner (Government) in these circumstances |
| Jurisdictional effect if discretionary-function applied | (Implicit) If exception applied, federal courts would lack jurisdiction | Government urged exception to defeat jurisdiction | Court found exception inapplicable; nonetheless affirmed judgment on state-law RPA ground |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (explains discretionary-function exception balances liability and protection for policy-based decisions)
- Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (Government liable when it undertakes a safety service and then fails to maintain it)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (two-step test for discretionary-function exception)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (presumption that discretionary acts are policy-based; clarifies limits where operational negligence is not protected)
- U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 562 F.3d 1297 (FTCA discretionary-function exception standards in Eleventh Circuit)
- JBP Acquisitions, LP v. United States ex rel. FDIC, 224 F.3d 1260 (discusses subject-matter jurisdiction implications of FTCA exceptions)
- Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523 (instruction to precisely identify challenged conduct for discretionary-function analysis)