848 F.3d 774
6th Cir.2017Background
- Moore was convicted in 1994 of kidnapping, robbery, and murder; Ohio courts affirmed his conviction and death sentence on direct appeal and denied collateral relief.
- Moore pursued multiple post-conviction attempts (trial court post-conviction petition, Ohio R. App. P. 26(B) reopening, federal habeas) and raised ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claims at various stages.
- In an earlier federal habeas decision, the Sixth Circuit granted limited relief on sentencing-phase IAC claims but held Martinez did not apply because Moore had raised an IATC claim on direct appeal.
- Moore filed a Rule 60(b) motion arguing Trevino (extending Martinez) and newly developed evidence of ineffective post-conviction counsel created extraordinary circumstances warranting reopening.
- The district court (adopting the magistrate judge) denied relief, concluding Trevino/Martinez did not apply because Moore’s IATC claim was adjudicated on the merits on direct appeal; the court also relied on the law-of-the-case doctrine and Pinholster limits on new evidence.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: Trevino/Martinez do not provide relief where the state adjudicated the IATC claim on the merits on direct review, and a change in decisional law alone is not the extraordinary circumstance Rule 60(b)(6) requires.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Trevino/Martinez permit excusing a procedural default to develop new IAC evidence under Rule 60(b) | Moore: Trevino extends Martinez to allow use of ineffective post-conviction counsel evidence to excuse default and reopen judgment | State: Trevino/Martinez do not apply because Moore raised IATC on direct appeal and the claim was decided on the merits | Denied — Trevino/Martinez do not apply where the IATC claim was adjudicated on direct appeal and not procedurally defaulted |
| Whether changed decisional law (Trevino) alone is an extraordinary circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6) | Moore: Trevino constitutes an extraordinary change enabling relief | State: A change in law alone is insufficient to meet the "extraordinary circumstances" standard | Denied — change in law alone is usually insufficient for Rule 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether law-of-the-case bars reconsideration of the court’s prior holding that Martinez did not apply | Moore: Trevino requires revisiting law-of-the-case because it affects availability of evidence | State: Prior appellate decision remains controlling; Moore’s situation doesn’t fit Martinez/Trevino exceptions | Affirmed — law-of-the-case applies; prior holding was not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust |
| Whether Pinholster limits permit consideration of new evidence developed in federal proceedings | Moore: New evidence should be considered under Trevino/Martinez framework | State: Pinholster limits review to the state-court record for claims adjudicated on the merits | Held — Pinholster continues to bar consideration of additional evidence for claims adjudicated on the merits by the state court |
Key Cases Cited
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (applied Martinez to Texas procedural framework)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance in initial-review collateral proceedings can establish cause for procedural default)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits federal habeas review to state-court record for claims adjudicated on the merits)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances and is rarely granted in habeas)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and contexts where prejudice may be presumed)
- Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (importance of counsel’s closing argument to adversary process and right to counsel)
- Moore v. State, 81 Ohio St.3d 22 (Ohio 1998) (Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated Moore’s IATC claims on direct appeal)