Lee Malvo v. Randall Mathena, 893 F.3d 265

Background

In 2002, when he was 17, Lee Boyd Malvo participated in a series of sniper shootings (the "D.C. Snipers") that resulted in multiple deaths and injuries; he was later arrested and prosecuted in Virginia.
In Chesapeake (2003–2004) a jury convicted Malvo of two counts of capital murder; the jury rejected death and returned life-without-parole (LWOP) for each count; the court formally sentenced him to LWOP in March 2004.
In Spotsylvania (October 2004) Malvo entered an Alford plea to capital murder and attempted capital murder and received two additional LWOP terms as part of a plea agreement that avoided a death exposure.
After these sentences, the Supreme Court issued Roper, Graham, Miller, and later Montgomery, which (collectively) forbid death for juveniles, restrict LWOP for juveniles, require consideration of youth characteristics before imposing LWOP, and held Miller retroactive on collateral review.
Malvo filed § 2254 habeas petitions challenging his four LWOP sentences; the district court granted relief (vacating the LWOP sentences and remanding for resentencing), and the Warden appealed.

Issues

Issue	Malvo's Argument	Warden's Argument	Held
1) Does Miller apply when state law permits judicial suspension of LWOP (i.e., are Virginia LWOP sentences "mandatory")?	Virginia law effectively produced mandatory LWOP because a jury could only choose between death and LWOP; trial courts and parties treated LWOP as mandatory.	Virginia courts have long-held judicial power to suspend sentences, so LWOP was not truly mandatory and Miller does not apply.	Miller/Montgomery apply beyond formally mandatory schemes; LWOP for juveniles can be invalid unless court considered whether offender is permanently incorrigible.
2) Did Malvo receive the Miller protections at his Chesapeake jury sentencing?	The sentencing did not include a finding whether Malvo was irretrievably corrupt; youth/attendant circumstances were not considered for the specific LWOP determination.	Extensive mitigation evidence about Malvo's youth was presented; jury and judge considered age-related evidence during sentencing.	The Chesapeake proceedings did not satisfy Miller/Montgomery because neither judge nor jury made the required determination separating transient immaturity from permanent incorrigibility.
3) Did Malvo waive Miller-based challenges by pleading in Spotsylvania and accepting stipulated LWOP terms?	The plea did not expressly waive collateral constitutional challenges to the sentence; substantive rights (a category Miller implicates) may not be waived implicitly.	Malvo accepted a plea to avoid death and agreed to the stipulated LWOP terms; Brady/Dingle principles bar reopening pleas when later law changes sentencing exposure.	The plea did not explicitly waive the right to challenge the sentence under subsequent substantive constitutional rules; Brady/Dingle are distinguishable and do not shield the LWOP sentences from collateral Miller relief.

Key Cases Cited

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders; meaningful opportunity for release required)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth and attendant circumstances)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review; LWOP unconstitutional for all but rare juveniles whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility)