375 P.3d 60
Alaska2016Background
- Olivia Lee‑Magana and Jacob Carpenter, former partners with a child, each filed long‑term domestic violence protective order (DVPO) petitions against the other after a tumultuous breakup and custody dispute.
- Lee‑Magana obtained a long‑term DVPO against Carpenter; Carpenter’s separate long‑term petition against Lee‑Magana was denied.
- Lee‑Magana moved for $1,000 in attorney’s fees in both matters; both motions were initially denied without explanation.
- On reconsideration the superior court explained it denied fees to Lee‑Magana for defending against Carpenter’s petition because awarding fees could chill legitimate relief and found Carpenter’s petition was not vexatious.
- The superior court denied fees to Lee‑Magana for her successful petition to the extent the proceedings addressed DV issues (denied with prejudice), but dismissed fee claims related to custody/support without prejudice.
- Lee‑Magana appealed only the superior court’s denials of attorney’s fees in the two DVPO cases.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prevailing respondent in a DVPO case may recover fees under AS 18.66.100 or Civil Rule 82 | Lee‑Magana argued she was the prevailing party and entitled to fees under Civil Rule 82 | Superior court and State: the statute authorizes fees to the petitioner only; Rule 82 is displaced where a specific statutory scheme exists | Held: Statute authorizes fees to petitioners only; Rule 82 does not provide fees here, so denial to respondent was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether an unsuccessful petitioner’s conduct (vexatiousness) can justify awarding fees to a respondent | Lee‑Magana argued Carpenter’s petition was vexatious and fees should be awarded | Superior court found Carpenter’s petition was not vexatious and declined to award fees to avoid chilling legitimate petitions | Held: Defer to superior court’s factual finding that petition was not vexatious; denial affirmed |
| Whether prevailing petitioner is presumptively entitled to attorney’s fees under AS 18.66.100(c)(14) | Lee‑Magana argued the statute authorizes reimbursement and policy favors awarding fees to encourage representation of DV victims | Superior court denied fees citing that much of the hearing dealt with custody/support and Carpenter’s stipulation reduced the need for fees | Held: Reversed as to Lee‑Magana’s successful petition — court should grant reasonable fees because denial lacked adequate justification |
| Whether the superior court’s stated reasons (custody/support overlap; respondent’s stipulation) justified denying fees | Lee‑Magana: those reasons are insufficient because most hearing addressed DV order details and stipulation did not negate the need for fees | Superior court relied on those reasons to deny fees in part | Held: Reasons were insufficient to show this was the exceptional case to deny fees; remand for calculation and award of reasonable fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21 (Alaska 2014) (standards for reviewing attorney’s fee awards)
- In re Vernon H., 332 P.3d 565 (Alaska 2014) (statutory fee schemes displace Civil Rule 82)
- Enders v. Parker, 66 P.3d 11 (Alaska 2003) (Civil Rule 82 inapplicable where fees are otherwise provided by law)
- Scully v. Scully, 987 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1999) (statutory discretion should seldom lead to denial where statute contemplates relief)
- Welcome v. Jennings, 780 P.2d 1039 (Alaska 1989) (standard for reversing attorney’s fee awards)