478 F.Supp.3d 389
N.D.N.Y.2020Background
- Plaintiffs are five New York outdoor auto-racing operators challenging Governor Cuomo’s COVID-19 executive orders that bar spectators at racetracks (the “Racetrack Spectator Ban”).
- Executive Order 202.32 (May 21, 2020) prohibited visitors/fans at racetracks while allowing operation with essential personnel and incorporated Department of Health/Gaming Commission guidance; it was extended through August 2020.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought a TRO/preliminary injunction, alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and state law (ultra vires action under Executive Law § 29-a).
- Plaintiffs principally relied on Soos v. Cuomo (free-exercise challenge to selective enforcement of gathering limits) but did not allege religious discrimination here.
- The State argued the orders were public-health measures and moved to dismiss; the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, mooting the injunctive request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment (speech/assembly/association) | Ban infringes right to assemble and expressive association at racetracks | Orders are neutral public-health measures justified under Jacobson and do not target protected speech | Dismissed — Plaintiffs failed to plead protected expressive conduct or retaliation; Jacobson deferential standard applies |
| Equal Protection (selective enforcement) | Racetracks were treated worse than demonstrators/other businesses; selective enforcement | Comparators are not "similarly situated"; Plaintiffs plead only conclusory comparisons | Dismissed — insufficiently pleaded that comparators were similar in relevant respects or that actions were motivated by impermissible considerations |
| Fifth Amendment (regulatory taking) | Ban denying spectators is a taking because it prevents earning income from property use | Orders are temporary public-health regulations; Penn Central factors do not support a taking here | Dismissed — claim ripe but fails on the merits under Penn Central: economic-impact pleaded vaguely, no investment-backed expectations shown, and character of government action (public-health regulation) weighs against a taking |
| State-law ultra vires and TRO/PI | Executive orders exceed statutory authority and injunctive relief required | State acted within emergency powers; injunctive relief inappropriate | Federal claims dismissed; court declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and denied TRO/PI as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard requiring factual plausibility)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1905) (deference to public-health regulations in epidemics)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (non-categorical regulatory-takings ad hoc factors)
- Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (S. Ct. 2019) (rejecting state-litigation requirement for takings suits)
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (ripeness — final decision requirement)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1993) (state must not treat religious activity differently from similar secular activity)
- Young v. New York City Police Dep’t, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (First Amendment protection applies when conduct is inseparably intertwined with a message)
- Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001) (selective-enforcement equal protection elements)