589 F.Supp.3d 506
D.S.C.2022Background
- Defendant Greg Robertson operates VendorAlley.com and co‑owns W+R Studios, a competitor of APC Data Analytics; Vendor Alley posts industry "dirt" and screenshots of private LinkedIn messages from plaintiff Noah Leask.
- Plaintiffs APC and Leask allege five blog posts (May 6, May 8, May 12 — two posts, and May 14, 2020) falsely portrayed Leask as criminally harassing and intimidating defendants’ (including female) employees, claimed he was fired, hinted at drug/mental‑health issues, and compared him to a violent movie character.
- Plaintiffs sued for defamation, negligence/negligent supervision and training, permanent injunction, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court treated the blog posts (attached to the motion) as authentic and integral to the complaint and conducted the First Amendment and South Carolina common‑law defamation analysis.
- Ruling on the motion: partial grant and partial denial — certain defamation claims and IIED survive; negligent supervision claims against W+R Studios survive in part; negligence claim against Robertson dismissed; injunction claim not dismissed at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defamation (whether statements actionable) | Blog posts falsely accused Leask of criminal harassment/threats, implied pattern of violent conduct, and falsely claimed he was fired; libel by implication. | Posts are rhetorical hyperbole, opinion, or based on disclosed facts; plaintiffs are public figures or speech concerned public matters so higher First Amendment standards apply. | Court denied dismissal for most posts: May 6, May 12 (threatening messages), and “Fired” post may be libelous by implication or contain provably false assertions; May 8 republished May 6 but adds nothing actionable; May 14 (movie comparison) and drug‑problem conjecture dismissed as nonactionable hyperbole/surmise. |
| Public‑figure / public‑concern determination | Plaintiffs: private figures and posts not a matter of public concern. | Defendants: Leask is prominent in industry and posts served public interest; higher First Amendment protection applies. | Court held: at motion to dismiss stage, cannot conclude Leask is a public figure or that the posts were on public concern; applied private‑figure/private‑matter analysis for now. |
| Negligence / negligent supervision & training | W+R Studios negligently failed to supervise/trained Robertson and its platform, permitting defamatory publications. | Such claims impermissibly seek to evade First Amendment limits and are really defamation claims. | Court dismissed ordinary negligence claim against Robertson as disguised defamation; allowed negligent supervision/training claim against W+R Studios to proceed to the extent tied to actionable statements. |
| Permanent injunction & IIED | Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief and damages for IIED from the publications. | Defendants move to dismiss both causes of action. | Court declined to dismiss injunction claim (no merits ruling at MTD stage); IIED claim survives to the extent it is premised on the statements the court found actionable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (constitutional protection does not extend to false statements of fact; distinguishes opinion/hyperbole from provable assertions).
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public‑figure actual malice standard for defamation).
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinguishes private vs. public figures and appropriate First Amendment limits).
- Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (speech solely of private concern receives lesser First Amendment protection).
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (content, form, and context determine public‑concern inquiry; First Amendment considerations for offensive speech).
- Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment bars recovery for emotional‑distress damages based on parody/ satirical statements about public figures absent actual malice).
- Chapin v. Knight‑Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993) (libel‑by‑implication doctrine; heightened scrutiny when expressed facts are literally true).
- CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280 (4th Cir. 2008) (statements not reasonably interpreted as factual are protected; First Amendment limits on defamation law).
- Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (clarifies "actual malice" standard and distinction from common‑law malice).