Leah Coleman v. Sonia Martinez (084489) (Camden County & Statewide), A-3-20

Background:

T.E., with a history of two prior aggravated assaults and documented psychotic episodes with auditory hallucinations, was referred to therapist Sonia Martinez after DCPP removed her five children.
Martinez (licensed social worker) treated T.E. over ~13 months and recorded multiple instances suggesting hallucinations; an HFC psychiatrist had instructed immediate psychiatric referral upon decompensation.
DCPP caseworker Leah Coleman emailed Martinez that T.E. told a family member she heard commanding voices and hid them from clinicians; Martinez told Coleman she would address it at a scheduled appointment.
At the November appointment Martinez disclosed Coleman as the source of the report; ten days later T.E. stabbed Coleman 22 times at DCPP, causing severe injuries.
Coleman sued Martinez for negligence (failure to refer and identifying Coleman); trial court granted summary judgment for Martinez (no duty), Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certification.
The Supreme Court held (affirming the Appellate Division) that under these facts Martinez owed Coleman a duty of care based on particularized foreseeability and fairness/public-policy factors; breach and proximate cause remain for the jury.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Martinez owed a duty to Coleman for harm caused by T.E.	Martinez knew of T.E.’s violence and hallucinations, failed to refer to psychiatrist, and identified Coleman — making Coleman a foreseeable victim.	No particularized knowledge that T.E. would assault Coleman; no direct threat communicated; duty not owed as a matter of law.	Duty exists under particularized-foreseeability and Hopkins fairness factors given Martinez’s knowledge and conduct; question of breach and causation go to the jury.
Applicability of N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16 immunity	N/A (Coleman argued statutory immunity inapplicable)	Martinez argued immunity under the statute for mental-health practitioners who incur no duty to warn/protect.	Statute’s immunity does not extend to licensed social workers (Martinez’s licensure); even if statute didn’t apply, common-law duty for professional treatment standards remains.
Breach and proximate cause (causal link to the stabbing)	Expert opined Martinez deviated from standards by not promptly notifying psychiatrist and by identifying Coleman; had she acted, attack would have been prevented.	Attack was unforeseeable or an intervening criminal act breaking causation.	Proximate cause is generally for the jury; on these facts a jury could find breach was a substantial contributing cause and not superseded.
Public policy / scope of duty (fairness)	Imposition of duty is fair: Martinez had relationship, ability to act, low burden to refer, and risk of serious harm was high.	Imposing duty conflicts with legislative scheme and places greater burden on social workers than on other mental-health professionals.	Court balanced Hopkins factors and concluded fairness and policy favor imposing a tailored duty when a patient’s threat to identifiable third parties is particularly foreseeable.

Key Cases Cited

J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330 (1998) (articulated "particularized foreseeability" test for third-party harm)
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466 (Law Div. 1979) (therapist may have duty to protect identifiable victims when patient presents a probability of danger)
Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23 (2006) (statutory duty-to-warn distinct from common-law duty to treat; practitioners may still be liable for departures from professional standards)
Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270 (1982) (foreseeability of third-party criminal acts can give rise to duty)
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496 (1997) (fact-specific foreseeability analysis in premises-liability/third-party crime cases)
People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246 (1985) (discussed identifiable class and foreseeability principles)
Kuehn v. Pub Zone, 364 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 2003) (duty imposed where proprietor knew of gang-related violence risk)
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1 (1999) (proximate-cause standard: substantial contributing factor)