526 S.W.3d 403
Tex.2017Background
- Plaintiff Shana Lenoir received prenatal care at a University of Texas clinic and died after receiving a progesterone injection administered while Dr. Leah Marino (formerly Gonski), a second-year resident, treated her. Plaintiffs sued Marino for malpractice.
- Marino was a resident in an ACGME-accredited program affiliated with the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UTHSCH); she was appointed under a University of Texas System Medical Foundation (Foundation) Notice of Appointment and paid by the Foundation.
- Marino moved to dismiss under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(f), arguing she was an "employee" of the Foundation (a governmental unit) and thus entitled to dismissal unless the Foundation were substituted as defendant.
- The trial court granted dismissal; the court of appeals reversed as to Marino, concluding she had not proved she was an employee of the Foundation. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.
- Record evidence: the Foundation paid residents and handled administrative functions and malpractice insurance, but UTHSCH program directors and clinical staff (employees of UTHSCH) assigned rotations and supervised residents; Foundation bylaws disavowed control over physicians at hospitals/clinics not owned by the Foundation.
- The Supreme Court concluded the undisputed evidence showed the Foundation did not control the details of Marino’s medical tasks; thus she was not an "employee" of the Foundation under the Tort Claims Act and dismissal under § 101.106(f) was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Lenoir's Argument | Marino's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marino was an "employee" of the Foundation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f) | Marino not employee; suit should not be dismissed unless governmental unit named | Marino was an employee of the Foundation because she was paid by it and appointed under its Notice of Appointment and Handbook | Marino was not an employee of the Foundation; dismissal under § 101.106(f) was improper |
| Whether "legal right to control" means theoretical/formal control or actual/practical control | The statute looks to practical control over details of work; Foundation lacked such control | ‘‘Legal’’ control can be satisfied by a contractual reservation of rights in the Handbook even if not exercised | Court rejects Marino’s narrow formalistic reading; statutory focus is on real control over details, not mere theoretical reservation of authority |
| Whether Foundation’s administrative functions (pay, records, insurance) suffice to establish control | Administrative functions do not establish control of medical tasks | Payment and handbook provisions show Foundation exercised employer authority | Administrative duties alone are insufficient; control of day-to-day medical assignments by UTHSCH shows Foundation did not control details |
| Whether precedent supports finding employee status here | Prior cases require control of details to find employment | Marino relied on Murk to show university affiliation can suffice | Court distinguishes Murk and follows precedent: where the university (UTHSCH) exercised control over resident assignments and supervision, the resident is not employed by the paying foundation |
Key Cases Cited
- Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. 2003) (faculty physician held employee where university exercised control over medical treatment details)
- St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002) (resident’s employment status depends on which entity controlled details of medical work)
- Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (procedural standards for asserting governmental immunity and appellate review when evidence was submitted)
- Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009) (de novo review of statutory construction questions)