Leah Anne Gonski Marino, M.D. F/K/A Leah Anne Gonski, M.D. v. Shirley Lenoir, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Shana Lenoir, and Christopher McKnight, Individually and as Next Friend of Nayla McKnight, 526 S.W.3d 403

Background

Plaintiff Shana Lenoir received prenatal care at a University of Texas clinic and died after receiving a progesterone injection administered while Dr. Leah Marino (formerly Gonski), a second-year resident, treated her. Plaintiffs sued Marino for malpractice.
Marino was a resident in an ACGME-accredited program affiliated with the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UTHSCH); she was appointed under a University of Texas System Medical Foundation (Foundation) Notice of Appointment and paid by the Foundation.
Marino moved to dismiss under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(f), arguing she was an "employee" of the Foundation (a governmental unit) and thus entitled to dismissal unless the Foundation were substituted as defendant.
The trial court granted dismissal; the court of appeals reversed as to Marino, concluding she had not proved she was an employee of the Foundation. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.
Record evidence: the Foundation paid residents and handled administrative functions and malpractice insurance, but UTHSCH program directors and clinical staff (employees of UTHSCH) assigned rotations and supervised residents; Foundation bylaws disavowed control over physicians at hospitals/clinics not owned by the Foundation.
The Supreme Court concluded the undisputed evidence showed the Foundation did not control the details of Marino’s medical tasks; thus she was not an "employee" of the Foundation under the Tort Claims Act and dismissal under § 101.106(f) was improper.

Issues

Issue	Lenoir's Argument	Marino's Argument	Held
Whether Marino was an "employee" of the Foundation under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f)	Marino not employee; suit should not be dismissed unless governmental unit named	Marino was an employee of the Foundation because she was paid by it and appointed under its Notice of Appointment and Handbook	Marino was not an employee of the Foundation; dismissal under § 101.106(f) was improper
Whether "legal right to control" means theoretical/formal control or actual/practical control	The statute looks to practical control over details of work; Foundation lacked such control	‘‘Legal’’ control can be satisfied by a contractual reservation of rights in the Handbook even if not exercised	Court rejects Marino’s narrow formalistic reading; statutory focus is on real control over details, not mere theoretical reservation of authority
Whether Foundation’s administrative functions (pay, records, insurance) suffice to establish control	Administrative functions do not establish control of medical tasks	Payment and handbook provisions show Foundation exercised employer authority	Administrative duties alone are insufficient; control of day-to-day medical assignments by UTHSCH shows Foundation did not control details
Whether precedent supports finding employee status here	Prior cases require control of details to find employment	Marino relied on Murk to show university affiliation can suffice	Court distinguishes Murk and follows precedent: where the university (UTHSCH) exercised control over resident assignments and supervision, the resident is not employed by the paying foundation

Key Cases Cited

Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. 2003) (faculty physician held employee where university exercised control over medical treatment details)
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002) (resident’s employment status depends on which entity controlled details of medical work)
Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (procedural standards for asserting governmental immunity and appellate review when evidence was submitted)
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009) (de novo review of statutory construction questions)