66 F.4th 905
11th Cir.2023Background:
- Florida enacted S.B. 90 after the 2020 election, revising rules for ballot drop boxes, a 150-foot solicitation zone (including a clause banning activity that has the “effect of influencing” a voter), and tighter rules on third-party delivery of voter‑registration forms (plus a now‑repealed registration‑disclaimer requirement).
- Several civil‑rights and civic organizations sued state officials and certain county supervisors; the district court found intentional racial discrimination and Section 2 violations as to three provisions (drop‑box, solicitation, registration‑delivery), enjoined them, and ordered limited Section 3(c) preclearance; it also held the solicitation provision vague/overbroad and enjoined a registration‑disclaimer provision later repealed.
- The State and Republican committees appealed; the Eleventh Circuit stayed the injunctions pending appeal and applied Purcell concerns in interlocutory posture.
- On merits review the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s findings of intentional discrimination and Section 2 violations as to the three challenged provisions, vacated the Section 3(c) preclearance order, affirmed that part of the solicitation clause was unconstitutionally vague, and vacated the judgment on the repealed registration‑disclaimer provision.
- The Eleventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings (including whether drop‑box and registration‑delivery provisions unduly burden voting under First/Fourteenth Amendments) and Judge Jill Pryor dissented on the equal‑protection/Voting Rights Act holdings.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether drop‑box, solicitation, and registration‑delivery provisions were enacted with racial discriminatory intent (Fourteenth/Fifteenth Amendments) | SB 90 targeted practices disproportionately used by Black voters and was adopted with intent to reduce Black turnout | Provisions were neutral election‑integrity measures (prevent fraud, secure chain‑of‑custody, uniform administration), not racially motivated | Reversed: district court clearly erred; record lacks reliable evidence of discriminatory intent or impact for drop‑box and solicitation; registration‑delivery fails on intent ground too |
| Whether the challenged provisions violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act | Plaintiffs: statutes deny equal opportunity/result in disparate racial effects | State: no discriminatory results; Johnson precedent requires showing discriminatory results | Reversed: Elec. Ct. follows Johnson — Section 2 requires discriminatory results under totality of circumstances; no results shown |
| Whether Section 3(c) preclearance was appropriate | Plaintiffs: preclearance justified because constitutional/VRA violations occurred | State: preclearance is extraordinary and requires proven Fourteenth/Fifteenth violations | Reversed: preclearance improper because Elec. Ct. rejected the constitutional/VRA violations that would justify Section 3(c) relief |
| Whether the solicitation provision is unconstitutionally vague/overbroad | Plaintiffs: statutory language (esp. “effect of influencing”) is vague and chills protected activity (e.g., civic aid in lines) | State: provision is administrable; mens rea and solicitation definitional text prevent vagueness | Affirmed in part/reversed in part: phrase prohibiting activity having the “effect of influencing” a voter is unconstitutionally vague; phrase prohibiting activity with intent to influence is constitutional and severable |
| Mootness and vacatur as to the registration‑disclaimer (repealed) | Plaintiffs: earlier injunction correct; repeal does not justify keeping judgment | State: repeal moots the claim; vacatur appropriate because repeal attributable to Legislature (non‑party) | Judgment vacated in part: appeal moot; vacatur granted because repeal resulted from legislative action not attributable to the litigants |
Key Cases Cited
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (framework for assessing discriminatory intent)
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (Section 2 results‑test and vote‑dilution analysis)
- Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (distinction between partisan and racial motives; VRA standards)
- Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for the State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. framework applying Arlington Heights and burden shifting)
- Johnson v. DeSoto County Bd. of Comm’rs, 72 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. holding that Section 2 requires discriminatory results)
- Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (legitimate state interest in preventing voter fraud)
- Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (preclearance is extraordinary federalism‑implicating remedy)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (vagueness doctrine principles)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (vagueness analysis: indeterminacy vs. difficulty of proof)
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (vacatur doctrine where appeal moots through happenstance)
- U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (vacatur equitable considerations)
- Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (vacatur practice guidance)