314 F. Supp. 3d 1205
N.D. Fla.2018Background
- Florida's Secretary of State (Detzner) issued Opinion DE 14-01 interpreting Fla. Stat. § 101.657(1)(a) to exclude any college- or university-related facilities (including student unions, on-campus stadiums, libraries) from consideration as in-person early voting sites.
- The Opinion effectively barred early voting on any public college or university campus, impacting roughly 830,000 students at Florida public institutions and creating a class of voters unable to seek on-campus early voting.
- Plaintiffs (six university students and two organizations: League of Women Voters and Andrew Goodman Foundation) challenged the Opinion, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement and to require the Secretary to notify supervisors that on-campus facilities may be used as eligible sites.
- The district court held a hearing and considered evidence showing (1) high concentrations of students living on/near campus, (2) longer travel times and limited car access for student neighborhoods, (3) high early-vote usage among students, and (4) higher rates of provisional and mail-ballot rejections for younger voters.
- The Court found supervisors of elections treat the Secretary’s written opinions as authoritative, so the Opinion functionally operated as statewide policy restricting site selection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Secretary's Opinion unlawfully restricts early voting in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Anderson-Burdick balancing) | Opinion imposes significant, disparate burdens on students by categorically denying on-campus early voting; burdens outweigh state interests | Opinion is a lawful statutory interpretation protecting the legislature’s choices and avoiding parking/disruption concerns | Court: Plaintiffs likely to succeed. Opinion imposes significant age-disparate burdens and Defendant offered only imprecise, insufficient interests; preliminary relief granted |
| Whether the Opinion violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (prohibition on abridging voting on account of age) | Opinion is intentionally discriminatory on account of age because it targets campus locations and thus falls heavily on young voters; Arlington Heights factors show invidious purpose | Opinion is neutral application of statute and administrative guidance, not discriminatory | Court: Plaintiffs likely to succeed under Arlington Heights; Opinion shows a stark, age-disparate impact and is unexplained by non-age reasons |
| Whether federal court can review and enjoin the Secretary’s interpretation of state election law (Pennhurst/Ex parte Young concerns) | Federal claims predominate; review of an official’s interpretation of state law is permissible when constitutional rights are alleged | Secretary argued Pennhurst prevents federal court relief that effectively interprets state law | Court: Pennhurst does not bar relief; Ex parte Young and controlling precedent permit federal review of state officers' actions that violate federal rights |
| Whether plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest for preliminary injunction | One-shot, time-sensitive harm to voting rights for students and organizational burdens; constitutional injury is irreparable; public interest favors expanded access | Injunction would disrupt supervisors' planning/timelines and might cause administrative burdens | Court: Irreparable harm shown; balance and public interest favor injunction; preliminary injunction issued restoring supervisors’ discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (establishes voting as a fundamental political right)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (Anderson-Burdick balancing framework for election regulations)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (framework requiring assessment of burden magnitude and state interests)
- Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality discussion of voting burdens and justification)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (federal courts may enjoin state officers for ongoing violations of federal law)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (framework for proving discriminatory intent/effect)
- Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating facially neutral provisions that in practice target disfranchised groups)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (equal protection principle that once franchise granted, state may not later enact arbitrary, disparate treatment)