League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Secretary of State, 948 N.W.2d 70

Plaintiffs (League of Women Voters and individuals) challenged Michigan’s absentee‑ballot statute, MCL 168.764a, which requires ballots to be received by 8:00 p.m. on election day, as violating Const 1963, art 2, § 4.
The Secretary of State largely agreed with plaintiffs that the receipt‑deadline is unconstitutional and did not robustly defend the statute, producing a near‑nonadversarial posture.
The Court considered plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of its July 31, 2020 order (denying leave to appeal) and motions for immediate consideration and to file supplemental authority; those procedural motions were granted and reconsideration was denied.
Justice Viviano concurred in denial, emphasizing concerns about “friendly” litigation and executive nondefense of statutes; he warned against courts resolving constitutional questions when parties lack true adversity and questioned appointing amici.
Chief Justice McCormack (joined by Justices Bernstein and Cavanagh) dissented from denial: she would grant reconsideration and expedited review, citing new evidence (USPS letter, mail‑processing changes, and uncounted absentee ballots from the August 2020 primary) showing a real risk of disenfranchisement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of absentee ballot receipt deadline (MCL 168.764a)	Deadline unconstitutionally disenfranchises absentee voters, especially given mail delays	Secretary largely agrees with plaintiffs that deadline is unconstitutional (nondefense)	Court denied reconsideration and did not reach the merits of constitutionality
Justiciability / adversarial posture when executive declines to defend statute	Plaintiffs should not be denied review because Secretary’s acquiescence is beyond plaintiffs’ control; injury remains	Lack of true adversity (friendly suit) undermines courts’ role; may preclude meaningful review	Concurring opinion flagged friendly‑suit concerns as additional reason to deny reconsideration; dissent disagreed and favored review
Whether the Court should secure an adversary (appoint amici or direct AG) to defend the statute	Court could invite amici (including Legislature) or direct the AG/appoint counsel to present opposing arguments to ensure full airing	Practical and institutional objections: appointing amici risks judicial overreach, unpredictability, cost, and will not develop trial‑level record	Court declined to adopt special measures here; concurrence opposed appointing amici in this case; dissent suggested such measures could be used to obtain adversarial briefing

Carducci v. Regan, 230 U.S. App. D.C. 80 (1983) (adversary presentation sharpens issues; courts not proper fora for self‑directed legal research)
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850) (condemning colorable or friendly suits seeking advisory opinions)
Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) (judicial determination of legislative validity legitimate only in real controversies)
Moore v. Charlotte‑Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (Court may dismiss when parties seek same result and no controversy exists)
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (vacating or dismissing portions of judgments where no controversy existed on specific claims)
Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Dir. of Consumer & Indus. Servs., 472 Mich. 117 (2005) (declaratory judgment requires adverse interests forming an actual controversy)
Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (Supreme Court may appoint amici to defend positions when government declines)