Lawson v. Office of the Attorney General
2013 Ky. LEXIS 640
| Ky. | 2013Background
- Lawson sought to enjoin disclosure of a 1983 proffer Lawson gave to the Kentucky Attorney General under a settlement restitution deal.
- The 1983 proffer related to Lawson’s company’s alleged involvement in bid rigging for highway contracts; Lawson pled guilty to a related federal antitrust count.
- Open Records Act requests in 2009–2010 sought the proffer; the Attorney General prepared to disclose it.
- Lower courts rejected Lawson’s standing objections and ordered disclosure, applying ORA exemptions or waivers.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky held Lawson lacked standing to invoke the l(h) exemption and that disclosure was permissible under the privacy exemption after balancing interests.
- The court affirmed the Court of Appeals, upholding disclosure of the proffer despite Lawson’s privacy concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lawson has standing to invoke KRS 61.878(l)(h). | Lawson has statutory standing as a private citizen to invoke exemptions. | Attorney General argues exemption l(h) applies to prosecutorial files and Lawson lacks class membership. | Lawson does not have standing to invoke l(h). |
| Whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of Lawson’s privacy under KRS 61.878(l)(a). | Disclosure would invade Lawson’s substantial privacy interests. | Public interest overrides privacy given the proffer’s relevance to government actions decades ago. | Disclosure does not violate privacy; public interest outweighs Lawson’s privacy. |
| Whether the 1983 proffer may be disclosed despite the Act’s general presumption of openness. | Exemptions must shield private information from disclosure. | Exemptions can yield to public interest when warranted by government accountability. | Disclosures permissible; exemptions do not bar disclosure absent waiver or stronger privacy showing. |
| Does the historical context of the proffer affect the balance of interests? | The proffer is old and its public value is minimal. | Historical record relates to government conduct and ongoing public accountability. | Public interest in government accountability outweighed privacy today. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson Co., 873 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1994) (extended ORA standing to enforce exemptions for private rights to avoid disclosure)
- Cape Publications v. City of Louisville, 147 S.W.3d 731 (Ky. App. 2003) (privacy interests in identifiable victims/stigmatized individuals subject to disclosure when public purpose exists)
- Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 826 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1992) (privacy exemption balancing test for unwarranted invasions)
- Central Kentucky News-Journal v. George, 306 S.W.3d 41 (Ky. 2010) (disclosure of settlement terms when public funds at issue)
- Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 941 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1997) (settlement disclosures and public interest in government action)
- Lexington-H-L Services, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 297 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2009) (identifiable donors/public funds and privacy versus public interest)
- Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Department of Justice, 489 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1989) (privacy balancing in FOIA; government transparency purpose)
- United States Department of State v. The Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) (privacy exemptions tied to agency interests and public light on government)