Lawrence Shandola v. Paula Henry
198 Wash. App. 889
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Lawrence Shandola sued several individuals after they opposed his transfer; trial court dismissed his claims and, under Washington’s anti‑SLAPP statute (RCW 4.24.525), entered monetary judgments against him ($10,000 plus costs and fees) in favor of each defendant.
- Shandola appealed and this court affirmed; the mandate issued and the judgments became final.
- The Washington Supreme Court later held the anti‑SLAPP statute unconstitutional in Davis v. Cox, invalidating the statutory basis for the monetary awards.
- About two months after Davis, Shandola moved under CR 60(b)(11) to vacate the money judgments, arguing the judgments had no valid statutory basis.
- The trial court denied relief on finality grounds; Shandola appealed that denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CR 60(b)(11) can vacate a final judgment based on a postjudgment appellate decision invalidating the statute that supported the judgment | CR 60(b)(11) allows reopening where a subsequent decision eliminates the legal basis for the judgment | Finality bars reopening; post‑judgment change shouldn’t undo closed cases | CR 60(b)(11) can provide relief based on a postjudgment appellate decision invalidating the statute |
| Whether Davis applies retroactively to this final judgment | Davis applies retroactively; new civil decisions typically do so and Davis shows no prospective-only intent | Retroactivity should not reach final, closed cases | Davis applies retroactively in the context of a CR 60(b)(11) motion; CR 60(b) specifically permits reopening final judgments |
| Whether res judicata bars CR 60(b)(11) relief | Res judicata doesn’t apply because Shandola did not file a second claim; he moved to reopen the same action | Res judicata and finality should prevent reopening | Res judicata is inapplicable; CR 60(b)(11) coexists with claim‑preclusion principles |
| Whether extraordinary circumstances justify relief under CR 60(b)(11) here | Davis (jury‑trial right), fairness not to enforce unconstitutional penalties, limited scope (only money awards), short statute duration, and statute was sole basis for awards justify relief | Emphasized finality and that Shandola didn’t raise the constitutional issue earlier | Court found extraordinary circumstances (including Davis and five supporting factors) and held trial court abused its discretion in denying relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269 (Wash. 2015) (held anti‑SLAPP statute unconstitutional for violating right to jury trial)
- Union Bank, N.A. v. Vanderhoek Assocs., LLC, 191 Wn. App. 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (postjudgment change in law can be extraordinary circumstance under CR 60(b)(11))
- In re Marriage of Flannagan, 42 Wn. App. 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (CR 60(b)(11) can reopen final decrees when extraordinary circumstances and a procedural mechanism exist)
- Akrie v. Grant, 183 Wn.2d 665 (Wash. 2015) (applied Davis to vacate statutory penalties under anti‑SLAPP)
- McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 179 Wn.2d 59 (Wash. 2013) (new civil decisions generally apply retroactively)
- James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (U.S. 1991) (discusses limits of retroactivity in civil cases due to finality)