Lawrence Rupert Smith v. William Terry, 491 F. App'x 81

Smith, a Georgia prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The complaint was filed January 14, 2010; a supplemental complaint with new claims and additional defendants followed March 30, 2010.
Georgia’s grievance process requires informal grievance, formal grievance, and Central Office appeal with time limits; Smith completed steps 1–2 and filed an appeal to Central Office.
The Commissioner denied the Central Office appeal on March 1, 2010, after Smith filed suit, but prior to any district court ruling on exhaustion.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal for failure to exhaust; the district court adopted that recommendation; Smith argued the supplemental complaint cured the exhaustion defect.
The issue on appeal is whether the supplementation could cure an already unexhausted original complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exhaustion was cured by the supplemental complaint.	Smith argues supplemental complaint cured exhaustion.	Smith failed to exhaust before filing the original suit; supplement cannot fix that.	No; supplementation cannot cure pre-suit exhaustion.
Whether Smith exhausted administrative remedies before bringing the § 1983 action.	Smith completed steps 1–2 and appealed, but did not receive denial or wait 90 days.	Exhaustion not complete until Commissioner denial or 90-day period elapsed.	Exhaustion was not satisfied before filing the suit.
Whether the district court properly dismissed under PLRA for failure to exhaust.	Supplemental pleading should cure exhaustion.	Exhaustion required at filing; supplementation does not retroactively cure.	Dismissal proper.

Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (interprets 'brought' to mean filing, not continuation; PLRA exhaustion required before suit)
Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2000) (prisoner must file grievance and exhaust remedies before pursuing § 1983 suit)
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998) (exhaustion mandatory; no discretion to waive)