394 P.3d 390
Wash. Ct. App.2017Background
- Garda CL Northwest is an armored-car employer with ~500 Washington drivers and messengers working varied routes; company-wide security policies required vigilance and limited personal items on trucks.
- Plaintiffs (Hill, Wise, Miller) sued on behalf of a class (employees from Feb 11, 2006 to Feb 7, 2015) claiming Garda denied legally sufficient meal periods and rest breaks under WAC 296-126-092, RCW 49.12 and RCW 49.46.
- Trial court certified the class, granted partial summary judgment on Garda's liability, and later awarded back wages, double damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees with a 1.5 lodestar multiplier; Garda appealed multiple rulings.
- Garda raised preemption defenses under the FAAAA and §301 LMRA, argued CBAs waived meal-period rights, and disputed willfulness and availability of prejudgment interest and fee multiplier.
- The court found company policies and Garda’s corporate testimony showed breaks were not vigilance‑free; no §301 or FAAAA preemption applied (because meal/rest rights are independent or variances are available); liability affirmed but double damages for meal violations and prejudgment interest on rest-break damages reversed; fee multiplier affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class certification under CR 23 | Common question: whether Garda provided legally sufficient breaks; class superior and manageable | Trial court failed to make sufficient CR 23 findings; individual CBA differences predominate | Certification proper: court identified overriding common issue and adequacy/superiority findings were sufficient |
| FAAAA preemption | Washington meal/rest rules are general workplace rules not preempted; Garda could seek a variance | Compliance would significantly affect Garda’s routes/prices/services, so FAAAA preempts state law | No preemption: Garda could seek a statutory variance (and Loomis precedent exists); impact on prices/routes is indirect/remote |
| §301 LMRA preemption / CBA waivers | Meal/rest rights are independent, nonnegotiable for private employees (except public/construction), so §301 doesn't bar state-law claims | Plaintiffs waived meal rights via branch CBAs; claims require CBA interpretation and are preempted | No §301 preemption: meal-period right cannot be waived by private‑sector CBA; court need not interpret CBAs to resolve liability |
| Liability for rest breaks and meal periods (summary judgment) | Garda's policies and 30(b)(6) testimony show no vigilance‑free breaks; breaks inadequate as matter of law | Individual facts and inconsistent enforcement create material issues of fact; waivers via CBAs create disputes | Summary judgment for Plaintiffs affirmed: policies and testimony show meaningful breaks were not provided; CBA waivers do not prove individual waiver |
| Double damages under RCW 49.52.070 | Violations of meal/rest rules are wage violations entitling double damages and fees | Meal-period failures are labor (not wage) violations; Garda’s conduct not willful | Meal-period and rest‑break violations are wage violations, but Garda had a bona fide dispute re: meal waivers → not willful; double damages for meal violations reversed |
| Prejudgment interest plus double damages | Prejudgment interest compensates delay; can co-exist with double damages | Double damages are punitive; prejudgment interest not allowed on punitive awards | Prejudgment interest on damages for which double (punitive) damages were awarded is reversed (no interest on punitive portion) |
| Attorney-fee lodestar multiplier | Contingent risk and novel issues justify multiplier | Case not risky enough to warrant multiplier | 1.5 multiplier upheld as reasonable given contingency and litigation risk |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 179 Wn.2d 47 (2013) (state supreme court arbitration/unconscionability authority referenced in procedural history)
- Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2014) (FAAAA does not preempt state meal/rest break laws where impacts are indirect and variances available)
- Pellino v. Brink's Inc., 164 Wn. App. 668 (2011) (armored-vehicle vigilance rules can negate ‘true’ breaks)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (§301 preemption principles: uniformity in labor-contract disputes)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (state-law claims substantially dependent on CBA may be preempted)
- Demetrio v. Sakuma Bros. Farms, Inc., 183 Wn.2d 649 (2015) (employer must affirmatively promote meaningful breaks; workplace culture that discourages breaks violates rule)
- Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 104 Wn. App. 583 (2000) (failure to provide rest periods can constitute a wage violation)
- Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988) (three-part test for §301 preemption analysis)