576 S.W.3d 605
Mo.2019Background
- Lawrence Rebman was an administrative law judge (ALJ) in Missouri appointed in 2013 and employed by the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations; ALJ salaries are statutorily tied to associate circuit judge pay.
- The General Assembly’s HB2007 appropriated funding for ALJ salaries for fiscal 2018 sufficient for 27 ALJs (down from 28) and limited use of the funds to ALJs appointed on or before Jan. 1, 2012, and on or after Jan. 1, 2015.
- Rebman was the sole ALJ appointed between 2012 and 2015; the funding restriction effectively prevented the department from using appropriated ALJ salary funds to pay his salary.
- The division director notified Rebman his employment would terminate when prior funding expired; Rebman sued for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction claiming the appropriation’s date-based funding restriction was unconstitutional.
- The Cole County circuit court declared the date-based restrictions unconstitutional as applied to Rebman, severed those phrases from HB2007, and permanently enjoined the State from terminating Rebman under that provision. The State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HB2007’s appropriation, by restricting which ALJs can be paid based on appointment date, impermissibly encroaches on executive appointment/removal authority and violates separation of powers | Rebman: date-based funding restraints effectively force the director to terminate a specific ALJ, infringing the director’s exclusive constitutional power to select and remove department appointees | State: legislature has plenary appropriation power and may defund or limit positions; the provision is a lawful exercise of appropriations authority | Held: The funding restriction violated separation of powers by effectively compelling the director to terminate a specific ALJ; unconstitutional as applied to Rebman |
| Whether the unconstitutional provisions should be severed or render the whole statute invalid | Rebman: severance preserves valid appropriation while removing unconstitutional selection-by-date language | State: (implicit) the appropriations scheme should stand; contested practical effects | Held: Severance appropriate; phrases referencing appointment dates severed and remainder of HB2007 left in force |
| Whether Rebman was entitled to a permanent injunction preventing termination | Rebman: termination pursuant to an unconstitutional statute would cause irreparable harm and leave no adequate remedy at law | State: injunctive relief was improper or premature; other parties/public interest weigh against injunction | Held: Permanent injunction appropriate; being subject to an unconstitutional statute constitutes irreparable injury and Rebman had no adequate alternative remedy |
| Whether the court’s relief impermissibly ordered expenditure of unappropriated funds | State: enforcing the injunction forces the department to spend beyond the legislature’s appropriation (27 vs. 28 ALJs) and thus intrudes on legislative appropriations power | Rebman: court merely forbade an unconstitutional method of selecting whom to pay and left spending decisions to the director within the appropriation | Held: Court did not order extra expenditures; it preserved the director’s discretion on how to use the appropriation and did not commandeer the legislature’s purse strings |
Key Cases Cited
- Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412 (Mo. banc 2001) (standard of review for court-tried cases and declaratory judgments)
- City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183 (Mo. banc 2017) (severability and separation-of-powers principles)
- State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. banc 1982) (purpose of separation of powers doctrine)
- State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on Legislative Research, 956 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. banc 1997) (legislature may influence executive via appropriations but has limits)
- State ex rel. Tolerton v. Gordon, 139 S.W. 403 (Mo. 1911) (legislature’s power to create or abolish offices subject to constitutional limits)
- Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1976) (being subject to an unconstitutional statute can be irreparable injury)
- State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Gabbert, 925 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. banc 1996) (elements for preliminary injunction discussed; distinguishes preliminary vs. permanent relief)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1803) (judicial role to interpret law)
