Lawrence Benton Roper v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 240
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Roper was charged in June 2015 with multiple drug and related felony counts and alleged as a habitual offender. He initially proceeded pro se and orally requested a speedy trial at his first hearing.
- The court set a pretrial conference for August 27, 2015; the State filed a Motion to Set Cause for Jury Trial on August 7, 2015, which the court did not rule on.
- On August 27 Roper indicated he was attempting to retain private counsel; the pretrial was continued to September 24, 2015.
- On September 24 Roper appeared pro se, signed a written motion for continuance that contained a waiver of his Criminal Rule 4 speedy-trial right, and informed the court he had retained counsel the day before. Trial was ultimately continued several times and began April 18, 2016.
- After conviction, Roper moved to discharge under Ind. Crim. R. 4(B)(1) (failure to try within 70 days of a jail-held speedy-trial motion). The trial court denied the motion; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Roper waived his Rule 4 claim by conduct inconsistent with seeking a speedy trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roper must be discharged under Ind. Crim. R. 4(B)(1) for not being tried within 70 days of his speedy-trial request | State: Court did not err; Roper waived the Rule 4 claim by allowing settings beyond 70 days and signing a continuance waiving speedy-trial rights | Roper: He requested a speedy trial at initial hearing and was not brought to trial within 70 days, so discharge is required under Rule 4(B)(1) | Roper waived his Rule 4 request by conduct (failing to object to dates beyond 70 days and signing a continuance with a waiver); denial of discharge affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1995) (court congestion and exigent circumstances may justify delay beyond 70 days)
- Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013) (defendant cannot use technical post‑hoc arguments to escape prosecution based on calendar scheduling)
- Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 1997) (failure to object to a pretrial/omnibus setting beyond 70 days constitutes waiver of speedy‑trial claim)
- Hahn v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (movant must object promptly to trial dates set beyond Rule 4 limits or waive the claim)
- Mefford v. State, 51 N.E.3d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (standard of de novo review for Rule 4 legal questions)