Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC
894 F.3d 9
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- Margaret Lawless, a nurse and union member covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), was discharged by Steward Health Care and sued in Massachusetts state court claiming unpaid paid-time-off (PTO) and extended sick leave (ESL) under the Massachusetts Wage Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148, 150).
- Lawless filed an administrative complaint with the Massachusetts Attorney General the same day she filed the state-court suit; the AG later assented to suit before judgment was entered.
- Steward paid most PTO and some ESL after the suit was filed but before judgment; Lawless amended to drop a breach-of-contract claim before removal to federal court.
- Steward removed the case to federal court asserting LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) complete preemption based on potential need to interpret the CBA; no party moved to remand.
- At oral argument in the First Circuit, the court questioned subject-matter jurisdiction; it concluded jurisdiction was proper because a colorable LMRA-preemption argument existed at removal and the district court permissibly retained supplemental jurisdiction over the Wage Act claim after the federal issue evaporated.
- On the merits, the court affirmed summary judgment for Lawless, holding that (1) the Wage Act requires payment "in full" on the day of discharge and (2) suit filed before AG assent is valid if the AG later assents before judgment, making Steward liable for late payment penalties (treble damages, fees).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was federal jurisdiction proper on removal via LMRA complete preemption? | Removal proper because resolving Wage Act unpaid-wages claim might require interpreting the CBA. | Removal improper; plaintiff's claim was purely state law and did not raise federal question. | Remand not required: a colorable complete-preemption argument existed at removal, so federal jurisdiction was proper. |
| If LMRA preemption collapsed, could the district court retain the Wage Act claim? | Yes; supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 permitted retention because claims arose from same facts and parties waived objection. | No challenge below; argued retention was improper after federal claim evaporated. | District court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction and parties waived objection to retention. |
| Does the Wage Act permit a plaintiff to file suit before AG assent (or before 90 days) and still recover if the AG later assents? | Yes; filing before assent is permitted so long as the AG ultimately assents before entry of judgment. | No; defendant urged that AG assent must precede suit (or that AG assent creates a grace period protecting employer until assent or 90 days). | Held for plaintiff: suit filed before assent is valid if the AG subsequently assents prior to judgment; late payment after filing can trigger Wage Act penalties. |
| Are ESL payments "wages" under the Wage Act (such that late ESL payment can trigger treble damages)? | Plaintiff proceeded assuming ESL were wages. | Steward raised SJC authority (Mui) suggesting ESL are not wages, and asked reversal as to ESL portion. | Court did not reach the argument on the merits because Steward waived it by failing to raise it below or in its opening brief; judgment awarding treble damages for ESL payment upheld. |
Key Cases Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1987) (complete preemption doctrine)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (§301 LMRA preemption of state-law contract claims)
- BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824 (1st Cir. 1997) (colorable preemption at removal; test for "interpretation" vs "consultation")
- Cavallaro v. UMass Mem'l Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Wage Act claim preemption analysis and supplemental-jurisdiction discussion)
- Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054 (Mass. 2013) (interpretation of Wage Act notice/AG role and purpose)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (removal requires claim to be one that could have been originally filed in federal court)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (U.S. 1994) (limits on §301 preemption and importance of distinguishing interpretation vs consultation)